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Abstract
Transaction Memory (TM) is a concurrency control abstraction that allows the pro-
grammer to specify blocks of code to be executed atomically as transactions. However,
since transactional code can contain just about any operation attention must be paid
to the state of shared variables at any given time. E.g., contrary to a database trans-
action, if a TM transaction reads a stale value it may execute dangerous operations,
like attempt to divide by zero, access an illegal memory address, or enter an infinite
loop. Thus serializability is insufficient, and stronger safety properties are required in
TM, which regulate what values can be read, even by transactions that abort. Hence,
a number of TM safety properties were developed, including opacity, and TMS1 and
TMS2. However, such strong properties preclude using early release as a technique
for optimizing TM, because they virtually forbid reading from live transactions. On
the other hand, properties that do allow early release are either not strong enough to
prevent any of the problems mentioned above (recoverability), or add additional con-
ditions on transactions with early release that limit their applicability (elastic opacity,
live opacity, virtual world consistency). This paper introduces last-use opacity, a new
TM safety property that is meant to be a compromise between strong properties like
opacity and serializability. The property eliminates all but a small class of inconsistent
views and poses no stringent conditions on transactions. For illustration, we present a
last-use opaque TM algorithm and show that it satisfies the new safety property.
1 Introduction
Writing concurrent programs using the low-level synchronization primitives is notoriously
difficult and error-prone. Over the past decade, there has been a growing interest in alterna-
tives to lock-based synchronization by turning to the idea of software transactional memory
(TM) [20, 28]. Basically, TM transplants the transaction abstraction from database systems
and uses it to hide the details of synchronization. In particular, TM uses speculative exe-
cution to ensure that transactions in danger of reading inconsistent state abort and retry.
This is a fairly universal solution and means that the programmer must only specify where
transactions begin and end, and TM manages the execution so that the transactional code
executes correctly and efficiently. Thus, the programmer avoids having to solve the prob-
lem of synchronization herself, and can rely on any one of a plethora of TM systems (e.g.,
[10, 17, 19, 18, 24, 27]).
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Since TM allows transactional code to be mixed with non-transactional code and to
contain virtually any operation, rather than just reads and writes like in its database prede-
cessors, greater attention must be paid to the state of shared variables at any given time. For
instance, if a database transaction reads a stale value, it must simply abort and retry, and
no harm is done. Whereas, if a TM transaction reads a stale value it may execute an unan-
ticipated dangerous operation, like dividing by zero, accessing an illegal memory address,
or entering an infinite loop. Thus, TM systems must restrict the ability of transactions to
view inconsistent state.
To that end, the safety property called opacity [14, 15] was introduced, which includes
the condition that transactions do not read values written by other live (not completed)
transactions alongside serializability [25] and real-time order conditions. Opacity became the
gold standard of TM safety properties, and most TM systems found in the literature are, in
fact, opaque. However opacity precludes early release, an important programming technique,
where two transactions technically conflict but nevertheless both commit correctly, and
still produce a history that is intuitively correct. Systems employing early release (e.g.
[19, 26, 13, 8, 31]) show that this yields a significant and worthwhile performance benefit.
This is particularly (but not exclusively) true with pessimistic concurrency control, where
early release is vital to increased parallelism between transactions, and therefore essential
for achieving high efficiency in applications with high contention.
Since opacity is a very restrictive property, a number of more relaxed properties were in-
troduced that tweaked opacity’s various aspects to achieve a more practical property. These
properties include virtual world consistency (VWC) [21], transactional memory specification
(TMS1 and TMS2) [11], elastic opacity [13], and live opacity [12]. The first contribution of
this paper is to examine these properties and determine whether or not they allow the use
of early release in TM, and, if so, what compromises they make with respect to consistency,
and what additional assumptions they require. We then consider the applicability of these
properties to TM systems that rely on early release. In addition to TM properties, we sim-
ilarly examine common database consistency conditions: serializability [25], recoverability
[16], avoiding cascading aborts (ACA) [7] , strictness [7], and rigorousness [9].
The second contribution of this paper is to introduce a new TM safety property called
last-use opacity that allows early release without requiring stringent assumptions but nev-
ertheless eliminates inconsistent views or restricts them to a manageable minimum. We
give a formal definition, discuss example last-use opaque histories, and compare the new
property with existing TM properties, specifically showing that it is stronger than serializ-
ability but weaker than opacity. We also describe the guarantees given by last-use opacity
and consider the applicability of the property in system models that either allow, deny, or
restrict the explicit programmatic abort operation. Whereas, last-use opacity eliminates
inconsistent views in system models that forbid explicitly aborting transactions or restricts
this to particular scenarios, we show that allowing free use of explicit aborts can lead to
inconsistent views in last-use opaque histories. Thus, we also introduce a stronger variant
of the property called β–last-use opacity that precludes them.
Finally, we give SVA [34], a TM concurrency control algorithm with early release and
demonstrate that it satisfies last-use opacity.
The paper is structured as follows. We present the definitions of basic terms in Section 2.
We follow by an examination of the TM property space in Section 3. Next, we define and
discuss last-use opacity in Section 4. Then, we present SVA and demonstrate its correctness
in Section 5. Finally, we present the related work in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
We also include an appendix containing additional proofs.
2
2 Preliminaries
Before discussing properties and their relation to early release, let us provide definitions of
the relevant ancillary concepts.
Let Π “ tp1, p2, ..., pnu be a set of processes. Then, let program P be defined as a set
of subprograms P “ tP1,P2, ...,Pnu such that for each process pk in Π there is exactly one
corresponding subprogram Pk in P and vice versa. Each subprogram Pk P P is a finite
sequence of statements in some language L. The definition of L can be whatsoever, as long
as it provides constructs to execute operations on shared variables in accordance with the
interface and assumptions described further in this section. In particular, L can allow local
computations whose effects are not visible outside a single processes.
Given program P and a set of processes Π, we denote an execution of P by Π as EpP,Πq.
An execution entails each process pk P Π evaluating some prefix of subprogram Pk P P. The
evaluation of each statement by a process is deterministic and follows the semantics of L.
EpP,Πq is concurrent, i.e. while the statements in subprogram Pk are evaluated sequentially
by a single process, the evaluation of statements by different processes can be arbitrarily
interleaved. We call EpP,Πq a complete execution if each process pk in Π evaluates all of
the statements in Pk. Otherwise, we call EpP,Πq a partial execution.
Variables Let V be a set of shared variables (or variables, in short). Each variable,
denoted as x, y, z etc., supports the following operations, denoted o, that allow to retrieve
or modify its state:
a) write operation w pxqv that sets the state of x to value v ; the operation’s return value
is the constant ok ,
b) read operation r pxq whose return value is the current state of x.
In order to execute some operation o on variable x, process pk issues an invocation event
denoted invkpoq, and receives a response event denoted reskpuq, where u is the return value
of o. The pair of these events is called a complete operation execution and it is denoted
ok Ñ u, whereas an invocation event invkpoq without the corresponding response event is
called a pending operation execution. Specifically, a complete execution of a read operation
by process pk is denoted r
kpxq Ñ v and a complete execution of a write operation is
denoted wkpxqv Ñ ok . We refer to complete and pending operation executions as operation
executions, denoted by op.
Each event is atomic and instantaneous, but the execution of the entire operation com-
posed of two events is not.
Transactions Transactional memory (TM) is a programming paradigm that uses transac-
tions to control concurrent execution of operations on shared variables by parallel processes.
A transaction Ti P T is some piece of code executed by process pk, as part of subprogram
Pk. Hence, we say that pk executes Ti. Process pk can execute local computations as well
as operations on shared variables as part of the transaction. In particular, the processes can
execute the following operations as part of transaction Ti:
a) start i which initializes transaction Ti, and whose return value is the constant ok i,
b) wipxqv and ripxq which respectively write a value v to variable x and read x within
transaction Ti, and return either the operation’s return value or the constant Ai,
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c) tryC i which attempts to commit Ti and returns either the constant Ci or the constant
Ai.
There is also another operation allowed in some TM systems and not in others, and we wish
to discuss it separately. Namely, some TMs allow for a transaction to programmatically roll
back by executing the operation:
d) tryAi which aborts Ti and returns Ai.
The constant Ai indicates that transaction Ti has been aborted, as opposed to the constant
Ci which signifies a successful commitment of the transaction.
By analogy to processes executing operations on variables, if process pk executes some
operation as part of transaction Ti it issues an invocation event of the form inv
k
i pstart iq,
invki poq for some x, or invki ptryC iq, (or possibly invki ptryAiq) and receives a response of
the form reski puiq, where ui is a value, or the constant ok i, Ci, or Ai. The superscript
always denotes which process executes the operation, and the subscript denotes of which
transaction the operation is a part. We denote operation executions by process pk within
transaction Ti as:
a) startki Ñ ok i,
b) rki pxq Ñ v or rki pxq Ñ Ai,
c) wki pxqv Ñ ok i or wki pxqv Ñ Ai,
d) tryC ki Ñ Ci or tryC ki Ñ Ai.
e) tryAki Ñ Ai.
TM assumes that processes execute operations on shared variables only as part of a
transaction. Furthermore, we assume that any transaction Ti is executed by exactly one
process pk and that each process executes transactions sequentially.
Even though transactions are subprograms evaluated by processes, it is convenient to talk
about them as separate and independent entities. Thus, rather than saying pk executes some
operation as part of transaction Ti, we will simply say that Ti executes (or performs) some
operation. Hence we will also forgo the distinction of processes in transactional operation
executions, and write simply: start i Ñ ok i, ripxq Ñ v , wipxqv Ñ ok i, tryC i Ñ Ci, etc. By
analogy, we also drop the superscript indicating processes in the notation of invocation and
response events, unless the distinction is needed.
Sequential Specification Given variable x, let sequential specification of x, denoted
Seqpxq, be a prefix-closed set of sequences containing invocation events and response events
which specify the semantics of shared variables. (A set Q of sequences is prefix-closed if,
whenever a sequence S is in Q, every prefix of S is also in Q.) Intuitively, a sequential
specification enumerates all possible correct sequences of operations that can be performed
on a variable in a sequential execution. Specifically, given D, the domain of variable x,
and v0 P D, an initial state of x, we denote by Seqpxq the sequential specification of x
s.t., Seqpxq is a set of sequences of the form rα1 Ñ v1, α2 Ñ v2, ..., αm Ñ vms, where each
αj Ñ vj (j “ 1..m) is either:
a) wipxqvj Ñ ok i, where vj P D, or
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b) ripxq Ñ vj , and either the most recent preceding write operation is wlpxqvj Ñ ok l (l ă i)
or there are no preceding writes and vj “ v0.
From this point on we assume that the domain D of all transactional variables is the set
of natural numbers N0 and that the initial value v0 of each variable is 0.
Even though we describe the interface and sequential specification of variables to rep-
resent the behavior of registers, we do so out of convenience and our conclusions can be
trivially extended to other types of objects e.g. compare and swap objects or stacks.
Histories A TM history H is a sequence of invocation and response events issued by
the execution of transactions TH “ tT1, T2, ..., Ttu. The occurrence and order of events
in H is dictated by a given (possibly partial) execution of some program P by processes
Π. We denote by H |ù EpP,Πq that history H is produced by EpP,Πq. Note, that different
interleavings of processes in EpP,Πq can produce different histories. A subhistory of a history
H is a subsequence of H.
The sequence of events in a history Hj can be denoted as Hj “ re1, e2, ..., ems. For
instance, some history H1 below is a history of a run of some program that executes trans-
actions T1 and T2:
H1 “ r inv1pstart1q, res1pok1q, inv2pstart2q, res2pok2q,
inv1pw1pxqvq, inv2pr2pxqq, res1pok1q, res2pvq,
inv1ptryC 1q, res1pC1q, inv2ptryC 2q, res2pC2q s.
Given any history H, let H|Ti be the longest subhistory of H consisting only of invoca-
tions and responses executed by transaction Ti. For example, H1|T2 is defined as:
H1|T2 “ r inv2pstart2q, res2pok2q, inv2pr2pxqq, res2pvq, inv2ptryC 2q, res2pC2q s.
We say transaction Ti is in H, which we denote Ti P H, if H|Ti ‰ ∅.
Let H|pk be the longest subhistory of H consisting only of invocations and responses
executed by process pk.
Let H|x be the longest subhistory of H consisting only of invocations and responses
executed on variable x, but only those that form complete operation executions.
Given complete operation execution op that consists of an invocation event e1 and a
response event e2, we say op is in H (op P H) if e1 P H and e2 P H. Given a pending
operation execution op consisting of an invocation e1, we say op is in H (op P H) if e1 P H
and there is no other operation execution op1 consisting of an invocation event e1 and a
response event e2 s.t. op1 P H.
Given two complete operation executions op1 and op2 in some history H, where op1
contains the response event res 1 and op2 contains the invocation event inv2, we say op1
precedes op2 in H if res 1 precedes inv2 in H.
A history whose all operation executions are complete is a complete history.
Most of the time it will be convenient to denote any two adjoining events in a history
that represent the invocation and response of a complete execution of an operation as that
operation execution, using the syntax eÑ e1. Then, an alternative representation of H1|T2
is denoted as follows:
H1|T2 “ r start2 Ñ ok2, r2pxq Ñ v , tryC 2 Ñ C2 s.
History H is well-formed if, for every transaction Ti in H, H|Ti is an alternating sequence
of invocations and responses s.t.,
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a) H|Ti starts with an invocation inv ipstart iq,
b) no events in H|Ti follow resipCiq or resipAiq,
c) no invocation event in H|Ti follows inv iptryC iq or inv iptryAiq,
d) for any two transactions Ti and Tj s.t., Ti and Tj are executed by the same process pk,
the last event of H|Ti precedes the first event of H|Tj in H or vice versa.
In the remainder of the paper we assume that all histories are well-formed.
History Completion Given history H and transaction Ti, Ti is committed if H|Ti con-
tains operation execution tryC i Ñ Ci. Transaction Ti is aborted if H|Ti contains response
resipAiq to any invocation. Transaction Ti is commit-pending if H|Ti contains invocation
tryC i but it does not contain resipAiq nor resipCiq. Finally, Ti is live if it is neither com-
mitted, aborted, nor commit-pending.
Given two histories H 1 “ re11, e12, ..., e1ms and H2 “ re21, e22, ..., e2ms, we define their con-
catenation as H 1 ¨H2 “ re11, e12, ..., e1m, e21, e22, ..., e2ms. We say P is a prefix of H if H “ P ¨H 1.
Then, let a completion ComplpHq of history H be any complete history s.t., H is a prefix
of ComplpHq and for every transaction Ti P H subhistory ComplpHq|Ti equals one of the
following:
a) H|Ti, if Ti finished committing or aborting,
b) H|Ti ¨ rresipCiqs, if Ti is live and contains a pending tryC i,
c) H|Ti ¨ rresipAiqs, if Ti is live and contains some pending operation,
d) H|Ti ¨ rtryC i Ñ Ais, if Ti is live and contains no pending operations.
Note that, if all transactions in H are committed or aborted then ComplpHq and H are
identical.
Two histories H 1 and H2 are equivalent (denoted H 1 ” H2) if for every Ti P T it is true
that H 1|Ti “ H2|Ti. When we write H 1 is equivalent to H2 we mean that H 1 and H2 are
equivalent.
Sequential and Legal Histories A real-time order ăH is an order over history H s.t.,
given two transactions Ti, Tj P H, if the last event in H|Ti precedes in H the first event
of H|Tj , then Ti precedes Tj in H, denoted Ti ăH Tj . We then say that two transactions
Ti, Tj P H are concurrent if neither Ti ăH Tj nor Tj ăH Ti. We say that history H 1
preserves the real-time order of H if ăHĎăH1 . A sequential history S is a history, s.t.
no two transactions in S are concurrent in S. Some sequential history S is a sequential
extension of H if S is equivalent to H and S preserves the real time order of H.
We analogously define a real-time order ăH of operation executions over history H.
Let S1 be a sequential history that only contains committed transactions, with the pos-
sible exception of the last transaction, which can be aborted. We say that sequential history
S1 is legal if for every x P V, S1|x P Seqpxq.
Using the definitions above allows us to formulate the central concept that defines con-
sistency in opacity: transaction legality. Intuitively, we can say a transaction is legal in a
sequential history if it only reads values of variables that were written by committed trans-
actions or by itself. More formally, given a sequential history S and a transaction Ti P S,
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we then say that transaction Ti is legal in S if VispS, Tiq is legal, where VispS, Tiq is the
longest subhistory S1 of S s.t., for every transaction Tj P S1, either i “ j or Tj is committed
in S1 and Tj ăS Ti.
Unique Writes History H has unique writes if, given transactions Ti and Tj (where i ‰ j
or i “ j), for any two write operation executions wipxqv 1 Ñ ok i and wjpxqv2 Ñ ok j it is
true that v 1 ‰ v2 and neither v 1 “ v0 nor v2 “ v0.
For the remainder of the paper we focus exclusively on histories with unique writes. This
assumption does not reduce generality, in that any history without unique writes trivially can
be transformed into a history with unique writes (for instance, by appending a timestamp
to each written value).
Accesses Given a history H and a transaction Ti in H, we say that Ti reads variable x
in H if there exists an invocation inv ipripxqq in H|Ti. By analogy, we say that Ti writes
to x in H if there exists an invocation inv ipwipxqvq in H|Ti. If Ti reads x or writes to x
in H, we say Ti accesses x in H. In addition, let Ti’s read set be a set that contains every
variable x, s.t. Ti reads x. By analogy, Ti’s write set contains every x, s.t. Ti writes to x.
A transaction’s access set, denoted ASetpTiq, is the union of its read set and its write set.
Given a history H and a pair of transactions Ti, Tj P H, we say Ti and Tj conflict on
variable x in H if Ti and Tj are concurrent, both Ti and Tj access x, and one or both of Ti
and Tj write to x.
Given a history H (with unique writes) and a pair of transactions Ti, Tj P H, we say Ti
reads from Tj if there is some variable x, for which there is a complete operation execution
wjpxqv Ñ ok j in H|Tj and another complete operation execution ripxq Ñ u in H|Ti, s.t.
v “ u.
Given any transaction Ti in some history H (with unique writes) any operation execution
on a variable x within H|Ti is either local or non-local. Read operation execution ripxq Ñ v
in H|Ti is local if it is preceded in H|Ti by a write operation execution on x, and it is non-
local otherwise. Write operation execution wipxqv Ñ ok i in H|Ti is local if it is followed in
H|Ti by an invocation of a write operation on x, and non-local otherwise.
Safety Properties A property P is a condition that stipulates correct behavior. In
relation to histories, a given history satisfies P if the condition is met for that history. In
relation to programs, program P satisfies P if all histories produced by P satisfy P.
Safety properties [23] are properties which guarantee that ”something [bad] will not
happen.” In the case of TM this means that, transactions will not observe concurrency
of other transactions. Property P is a safety property if it meets the following definition
(adapted from [5]):
Definition 1. A property P is a safety property if, given the set HP of all histories that
satisfy P:
a) Prefix-closure: every prefix H 1 of a history H P HP is also in HP,
b) Limit-closure: for any infinite sequence of finite histories H0, H1, ..., s.t. for every
Hh P HP and Hh is a prefix of Hh`1, the infinite history that is the limit of the sequence
is also in HP.
For distinction, in the remainder of the paper we refer to properties that are not safety
properties as consistency conditions.
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3 Early Release
In this section we discuss whether existing safety properties and consistency conditions allow
for early release (extending our work in [33]) and to what extent. The aim of the analysis is
to find properties that describe the guarantees of TM systems with early release that can be
applied in practice. That is, we seek a safety property that allows early release but reduces
or eliminates undesired behaviors.
Early release pertains to a situation where conflicting transactions execute partially in
parallel while accessing the same variable. The implied intent is for all such transactions
to access these variables without losing consistency and thus for them all to finally commit.
We define the concept of early release as follows:
Definition 2 (Early Release). Given history H (with unique writes), transaction Ti P H
releases variable x early in H iff there is some prefix P of H, such that Ti is live in P and
there exists some transaction Tj P P such that there is a complete non-local read operation
execution opj “ rjpxq Ñ v in P |Tj and a write operation execution opi “ wipxqv Ñ ok i in
P |Ti such that opi precedes opj in P .
We begin our analysis by defining its key questions. The first and the most obvious is
whether a particular property supports early release at all. This is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Early Release Support). Property P supports early release iff given some
history H that satisfies P there exists some transaction Ti P H, s.t. Ti releases some
variable x early in H.
If a property allows early release, it allows a significant performance boost (e.g. [26, 31])
as transactions are executed with a higher degree of parallelism. However, early release
can give rise to some unwanted or unintuitive scenarios with respect to consistency. The
most egregious of these is overwriting, where one transaction releases some variable early,
but proceeds to modify it afterward. In that case, any transaction that started executing
operations on the released variable will observe an intermediate value with respect to the
execution of the other transaction, ie., view inconsistent state.
An example of overwriting is shown in Fig. 1, where transaction Ti releases variable x
early but continues to write to x afterward. As a consequence, Tj first reads the value of x
that is later modified. When Tj detects it is in conflict while executing a write operation it
is aborted. This is a way for the TM to attempt to mitigate the consequences of viewing
inconsistent state. The transaction is then restarted as a new transaction Tj1 .
However, as argued in [15], simply aborting a transaction that views inconsistent state
is not enough, since the transaction can potentially act in an unpredictable way on the
basis of using an inconsistent value to perform local operations. For instance, if the value is
used in pointer arithmetic it is possible for the transaction to access an unexpected memory
location and crash the process. Alternatively, if the transaction uses the value within a loop
condition, it can enter an infinite loop and become parasitic.
Thus, in our analysis of existing properties we ask the question whether, apart from
allowing early release, the properties also forbid overwriting. In the light of the potential
dangerous behaviors that can be caused by it, we consider properties that allow overwriting
to be too weak to be practical.
Definition 4 (Overwriting Support). Property P supports overwriting iff P supports early
release, and given some history H (with early release) that satisfies P, for some pair of
transactions Ti, Tj P H s.t.,
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Ti
start i wipxq1 wipxq2 tryC iÑCi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 wjpxq3ÑAj
Tj1
startj1 rj1pxq2 wj1pxq4 tryC j1ÑCj1
Figure 1: History with early release and overwriting. The diagram depicts some history
H presented as operations executed by transactions on a time axis. Every line depicts the
operations executed by a particular transaction, e.g., the line marked Ti depicts subhistory
H|Ti. The symbol denotes a complete operation execution (an invocation event imme-
diately followed by a response event). For brevity, whenever the response event of some
operation execution is ok i we omit it, eg., we write wipxq1 rather than wipxq1Ñ ok i. We
also shorten the representation of complete read operation executions, so that eg. rjpxq Ñ 1
is represented as rjpxq1. The arrow is used to emphasize a happens before relation, and
denotes that the preceding transaction aborts (here, Tj) and a new transaction (Tj1)
is spawned.
Ti
start i wipxq1 tryAiÑAi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 wjpxq2ÑAj
Tj1
startj1 rj1pxq0 wj1pxq3 tryC j1ÑCj1
Figure 2: History with early release and cascading abort.
a) Ti releases some variable x early,
b) H|Ti contains two write operation executions: wipxqv Ñ ok i and wipxqv 1 Ñ ok i, s.t.
the former precedes the latter in H|Ti,
c) H|Tj contains a read operation execution rjpxq Ñ v that precedes wipxqv 1 Ñ ok i in H.
In addition, we look at whether or not a particular property forbids a transaction that
releases some variable early to abort. This is a precaution taken by many properties to
prevent cascading aborts, another type of scenario leading to inconsistent views. An example
of this is shown in Fig. 2. In such a case a transaction, here Ti, releases a variable early and
subsequently aborts. This can cause another transaction Tj that executed operations on
that variable in the meantime to observe inconsistent state. In order to maintain consistency,
a TM will then typically force Tj to abort and restart as a result.
However, while the condition that no transaction that releases early can abort, solves the
problem of cascading aborts, it significantly limits the usefulness of any TM that satisfies
it, since TM systems typically cannot predict whether any particular transaction eventu-
ally commits or aborts. In particular, there are important applications for TM, where a
transaction can arbitrarily and uncontrollably abort at any time. Such applications include
distributed TM and hardware TM, where aborts can be caused by outside stimuli, such as
machine crashes.
An exception to this may be found in systems making special provisions to ensure that
irrevocable transactions eventually commit (see e.g., [37]). In such systems, early release
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Ti
start i wipxq1 tryAiÑAi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryAiÑAi
Figure 3: History with an aborting early release transaction.
transactions could be ensured never to abort. However, case in point, these take drastic
measures to ensure that, e.g., at most a single irrevocable transaction is present in the
system at one time. Therefore, the requirement may be difficult to enforce.
Finally, the requirement that transactions which released early must not abort precludes
some scenarios that are intuitively correct. For instance, take the example in Fig. 3. Here,
Ti writes 1 to x and releases it early. Tj reads 1 from x and then aborts by executing the
tryA operation, which also causes Ti to abort. Since Tj reads from Ti while the latter is
live, Ti releases early in this history. Then, if there is a requirement that transactions which
release early not abort, then this history is an incorrect one. However, since Tj aborted on
its own accord, there are no transactions that would be affected by Ti aborting later on.
Hence, intuitively, the history is actually correct. Thus, we consider the requirement that
transactions which release early must not abort to be overstrict.
Hence, we seek properties that allow aborts in transactions that release early.
Definition 5 (Aborting Early Release Support). Property P supports aborting early release
iff P supports early release, and given some history H that satisfies P, for some transaction
Ti P H that releases some variable x early, H|Ti contains Ai.
The properties under consideration are the typical TM safety properties: serializability,
opacity, transactional memory specification, virtual world consistency, and elastic opacity.
Furthermore, we examine some of the family of live properties from [12], since this recent
work introduces a number of relaxed versions of TM safety properties with the view of
accommodating early release. Finally, we consider some strong database consistency con-
ditions that pertain to transactional processing: recoverability, avoiding cascading aborts,
strictness, and rigorousness.
3.1 Serializability
The first property we consider is serializability, which can be regarded as a baseline TM
safety property. It is defined in [25] in three variants: conflict serializability, view serial-
izability, and final-state serializability. We follow a more general version of serializability
defined in [36] (as global atomicity), which we adjust to account for non-atomicity of commits
in our model.
Definition 6 (Serializability). History H is serializable iff there exists some sequential
history S equivalent to a completion ComplpHq such that any committed transaction in S
is legal in S.
This definition does not preclude early release, as long as illegal transactions are aborted.
Serializability also permits overwriting and cascading aborts.
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Theorem 1. Serializability supports early release.
Proof. Let H be a transactional history as shown in Fig. 1. Note that since all transactions
in H are committed or aborted then H “ ComplpHq. Then, let there be a sequential history
S “ H|Ti ¨H|Tj ¨H|Tj1 . Note that S ” H. Trivially, all the committed transactions in S,
i.e. Ti and T
1
j , are legal in S, so H is serializable. Since, by Def. 2, Ti releases early in H,
then, by Def. 3, serializability supports early release.
Theorem 2. Serializability supports overwriting.
Proof. Let H be a serializable history as in the proof of Theorem 1 above. Transaction Ti
writes 1 to x in H prior to Tj reading 1 from x, and subsequently Ti writes 2 to x. Thus,
according to Def. 4, serializability supports overwriting.
Theorem 3. Serializability supports aborting early release.
Proof. LetH be a history such as the one in Fig. 2. Since all transactions inH are committed
or aborted then H “ ComplpHq. Then, let S be a sequential history equivalent to H such
that S “ H|Ti ¨ H|Tj ¨ H|Tj1 . S contains only one committed transaction Tj1 , which is
trivially legal in S. Thus H is serializable. In addition, transaction Ti in S both releases x
early (Def. 2) and contains an abort (Ai P H|Ti). Thus, by Def. 5, serializability supports
aborting early release.
3.2 Opacity
Opacity [14, 15] can be considered the standard TM safety property that guarantees seri-
alizability and preservation of real-time order, and prevents reading from live transactions.
It is defined by the following two definitions. The first definition specifies final state opacity
that ensures the appropriate guarantees for a complete transactional history. The second
definition uses final state opacity to define a safety property that is prefix closed. Both
definitions follow those in [15].
Definition 7 (Final state opacity). A finite TM history H is final-state opaque if, and only
if, there exists a sequential history S equivalent to any completion of H s.t.,
(a) S preserves the real-time order of H,
(b) every transaction Ti in S is legal in S.
Definition 8 (Opacity). A TM history H is opaque if, and only if, every finite prefix of H
is final-state opaque.
Theorem 4. Opacity does not support early release.
Proof. By contradiction let us assume that opacity supports early release. Then, from
Def. 3, there exists some history H (with unique writes), s.t. H is opaque and there exists
some transaction Ti P H that releases some variable x early in H.
From Def. 2, this implies that there exists some prefix P of H s.t.
a) there is an operation execution opi “ wipxqv Ñ ok i and opi P P |Ti,
b) there exists a transaction Tj P P (i ‰ j) and an operation execution opj “ rjpxq Ñ v ,
s.t. opj P P |Tj and opi precedes opj in P ,
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c) Ti is live in P .
Let Pc be any completion of P . Since Ti is live in P , by definition of completion, it is
necessarily aborted in Pc (ie. Ai P Pc|Ti). Given any sequential history S equivalent to
Pc, since Ti is aborted in Pc and VispS, Tjq only contains operations of committed transac-
tions, then Pc|Ti Ę VispS, Tjq. This means that opj P VispS, Tjq but opi R VispS, Tjq, so
VispS, Tjq Ę Seqpxq and therefore VispS, Tjq is not legal.
On the other hand, Def. 8 implies that any prefix P of H is final state opaque, which, by
Def. 7, implies that there exists some completion Pc of P for which there exists an equivalent
sequential history S s.t., any Tj in S is legal in S. Since any Tj is legal then for any Tj ,
VispS, Tjq is legal. This is a contradiction with the paragraph above. Thus, there cannot
exist a history like H that is both opaque and contains a transaction that releases some
variable early.
Since both Def. 4 and Def. 5 require early release support, then:
Corollary 1. Opacity does not support overwriting.
Corollary 2. Opacity does not support aborting early release.
3.3 TMS1 and TMS2
In [11] the authors argue that some scenarios, such as sharing variables between transactional
and non-transactional code, require additional safety properties. Thus, they propose and
rigorously define two consistency conditions for TM: transactional memory specification 1
(TMS1) and transactional memory specification 2 (TMS2).
TMS1 follows a set of design principles including a requirement for observing consistent
behavior that can be justified by some serialization. Among others, TMS1 also requires
that partial effects of transactions are hidden from other transactions. These principles are
reflected in the definition of the TMS1 automaton, and we paraphrase the relevant parts of
the condition for the correctness of an operation’s response in the following definitions (see
the definitions of extConsPrefix and validResp for TMS1 in [11]).
Given a history H and some response event r in H, let HÒr denote a subhistory of H
s.t. for every operation execution op P H, op P HÒr iff op ăH r and op is complete. This
represents all operations executed ,,thus far,” when considering the legality of r.
Let TdH be the set of all transactions in H s.t. Tk P TdH iff Tk P H and invkptryC kq P
H|Tk. Given response event r, let TdHÒr be the set of all transactions in H s.t. Tk P TdHÒr
if Tk P TdH and invkptryC kq ăH r. These sets represent transactions which committed or
aborted (but are not live) and the set of all such transactions that did so before response
event r.
Given some history H, let T1H by any subset of transactions in H. Let σ be a sequence of
transactions. Let serpT1H ,ăHq be a set of all sequences of transactions s.t. σ P serpT1H ,ăHq
if σ contains every element of T1H exactly once and for any Ti, Tj P T1H , if Ti ăH Tj then Ti
precedes Tj in σ.
Given a history H and some response event r in H, let opspσ, rq be a sequence of operations
s.t. if σ “ rT1, T2, ..., Tns then opspσ, rq “ HÒr|T1 ¨ HÒr|T2 ¨ ... ¨ HÒr|Tn. This represents
the sequential history prior to response event r that respects a specific order of transactions
defined by σ.
The most relevant condition in TMS1 with respect to early release checks the validity
of individual response operations. A prequisite for checking validity is to check whether
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a response event can be justified by some externally consistent prefix. This prefix consists
of operations from all transactions that precede the response event and whose effects are
visible to other transactions. Specifically, if a transaction precedes another transaction in
the real time order, then it must be both committed and included in the prefix, or both
not committed and excluded from the prefix. However, if a transaction does not precede
another transaction, it can be in the prefix regardless of whether it committed or aborted.
Definition 9 (Extended Consistent Prefix). Given a history H and a response event r, let
the set of transactions TrH be any subset of all transactions in H s.t. for any Ti, Tj P TrH , if
Ti ăH Tj then Ti is in TrH iff resipCiq P HÒr|Ti.
TMS1 specifies that each response to an operation invocation in a safe history must be
valid. Intuitively, a valid response event is one for which there exists a sequential prefix that
is both legal and meets the conditions of an externally consistent prefix. More precisely, the
following condition must be met.
Definition 10 (Valid Response). Given a transaction Ti in H, we say the response r to some
operation invocation e is valid if there exists set TrH Ď TdÒr and sequence σ P serpTrH ,ăHq
s.t. TrH satisfies Def. 9 and opspσ ¨ Ti, rq ¨ reÑ rs is legal.
Theorem 5. TMS1 does not support early release.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that TMS1 supports early release. Then by Def. 3, there
exists some TMS1 history H s.t. Ti, Tj P H and there is a prefix P of H s.t. opi “
wipxqv Ñ ok i P P |Ti, opj “ rjpxq Ñ v P P |Tj , and Ti is live in H. This implies that
inv iptryC iq R PÒresjpvq|Ti. This means that Ti R Td and therefore not in any T1 Ď Td or,
by extension, any σ P serpT1,ăHq. Therefore, there is no opi in opspσ, resjpvqq, so, assuming
unique writes, opj is not preceded by a write of v to x in opspσ ¨ Tj , resjpvqq ¨ rrjpxq Ñ v s.
Therefore, opspσ ¨ Tj , resjpvqq ¨ rrjpxq Ñ v s is not legal, which contradicts Def. 10.
Since both Def. 4 and Def. 5 require early release support, then:
Corollary 3. TMS1 does not support overwriting.
Corollary 4. TMS1 does not support aborting early release.
TMS2 is a stricter, but more intuitive version of TMS1. Since the authors show in [11]
that TMS2 is strictly stronger than TMS1 (TMS2 implements TMS1), the conclusions above
equally apply to TMS2. Hence, from Theorem 5:
Corollary 5. TMS2 does not support early release.
Corollary 6. TMS2 does not support overwriting.
Corollary 7. TMS2 does not support aborting early release.
3.4 Virtual World Consistency
The requirements of opacity, while very important in the context of TM’s ability to execute
any operation transactionally, can often be excessively stringent. On the other hand serial-
izability is considered too weak for many TM applications. Thus, a weaker TM consistency
condition called virtual world consistency (VWC ) was introduced in [21]. The definition of
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Ti
start i ripxq0 wipxq1 ripyq0 tryC iÑCi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryC iÑCi
Figure 4: VWC history with early release.
VWC depends on causal past. The causal past CpH,Tiq of some transaction Ti in some his-
tory H is the set that contains Ti and all aborted or committed transactions that precede Ti
in H. A causal past CpH,Tiq is legal, if for every Tj P CpH,Tiq, s.t. i ‰ j, Tj is committed
in H.
Definition 11 (Virtual World Consistency). History H is virtual world consistent iff all
committed transactions are serializable and preserve real-time order, and for each aborted
transaction there exists a linear extension of its causal past that is legal.
This property allows a limited support for early release as follows.
Theorem 6. VWC supports early release.
Proof. Let H be a transactional history as shown in Fig. 4. Here, Ti performs two operations
on x and one on y, while Tj reads x. The linear extension of H is S “ H|Ti ¨H|Tj wherein
both transactions are trivially legal. Thus H is VWC. Since, by Def. 2, Ti releases early in
H, then, by Def. 3, VWC supports early release.
Theorem 7. VWC does not support overwriting.
Proof. Since VWC requires that aborting transactions view a legal causal past, then if a
transaction reading x is aborted, it must read a legal (i.e. ”final”) value of x. Thus, let us
consider some history H where some Ti releases x early, and some Tj reads x from Ti.
a) If Ti writes to x after releasing it, and Tj commits, then Tj is not legal, and therefore H
does not satisfy VWC.
b) If Ti writes to x after releasing it, and Tj aborts, then the causal past of Tj contains Ti,
and Tj reads an illegal (stale) value of x from Ti, so H does not satisfy VWC.
Therefore, any history H containing Ti, such that Ti releases x early and modifies it after
release does not satisfy VWC. Hence, by Def. 4, VWC does not support overwriting.
While VWC supports early release, there are severe limitations to this capability. That
is, VWC does not allow a transaction that released early to subsequently abort for any
reason.
Theorem 8. VWC does not support aborting early release
Proof. Given a history H that satisfies VWC and a transaction Ti P H that releases variable
x in H, let us assume for the sake of contradiction that Ti eventually aborts. By Def. 2,
there is some Tj in H that reads from Ti. If Ti eventually aborts, then Tj reads from an
aborted transaction.
a) If Tj eventually aborts, then its causal past contains two aborted transactions (Ti and
Tj) and is, therefore, illegal. Hence H does not satisfy VWC, which is a contradiction.
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b) If Tj eventually commits, then the sequential witness history is also illegal. Hence H
does not satisfy VWC, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, if Ti eventually aborts, H does not satisfy VWC, which is a contradiction. Thus,
since a VWC history cannot contain an abortable transaction that releases a variable early.
Hence, by Def. 5, VWC does not support aborting early release.
VWC does not allow for transactions that release early to abort, which we consider to
be an impractical assumption in some TM systems and an overstrict requirement in general.
3.5 Live Opacity
Live opacity was introduced in [12] as part of a set of consistency conditions and safety prop-
erties that were meant to regulate the ability of transactions to read from live transactions.
The work analyzes a number of properties and for each one presents a commit oriented
variant that forbids early release and a live variant that allows it. Here, we concentrate
on live opacity, since it best fits alongside the other properties presented here, however our
conclusions will apply to the remainder of live properties.
Let H|pTi, rq be the longest subsequence of H|Ti containing only read operation ex-
ecutions (possibly pending), with the exclusion of the last read operation if its response
event is Ai. Let H|pTi, grq be a subsequence of H|pTi, rq that contains only non-local
operation executions. Let T ri be a transaction that invokes the same transactional oper-
ations as those invoked in H|pTi, rq ¨ rinv iptryC iqs if H|pTi, rq ‰ ∅, or ∅ otherwise. Let
T gri be a transaction that invokes the same transactional operations as those invoked inrstart i Ñ ok is ¨H|pTi, grq ¨ rtryC i Ñ Cis if H|pTi, grq ‰ ∅, or ∅ otherwise.
Given a history H, a transaction Ti P H, and a complete local operation execution
op “ ripxq Ñ v , we say the latter’s response event resipvq is legal if the last preceding write
operation in H|Ti writes v to x. We say sequential history S justifies the serializability
of history H when there exists a history H 1 that is a subsequence of H s.t. H’ contains
invocation and response events issued and received by transactions committed in H, and S
is a legal history equivalent to H 1.
Definition 12 (Live Opacity). A history H is live opaque iff, there exists a sequential
history S that preserves the real time order of H and justifies that H is serializable and all
of the following hold:
a) We can extend history S to get a sequential history S1 such that:
– for each transaction Ti P H s.t. Ti R S, T gri P S1,
– if ă is a partial order induced by the real time order of S in such a way that for each
transaction Ti P H s.t. Ti R S we replace each instance of Ti in the set of pairs of the
real time order of H with transaction T gri , then S
1 respects ă,
– S’ is legal.
b) For each transaction Ti P H s.t. Ti R S and for each operation op in T ri that is not in
T gri , the response for op is legal.
Theorem 9. Live opacity supports early release.
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Ti
start i wipxq1 tryC iÑCi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryC iÑCi
Figure 5: Live opaque history with early release.
Proof. Let history H be that represented in Fig. 5. Since there is a transaction Ti P H that
writes 1 to x and a transaction Tj that reads 1 from x before Ti commits, then there is a
prefix P of H that meets Def. 2. Therefore Ti releases x early in H.
Let S be a sequential history s.t. S “ H|Ti ¨ H|Tj . Since the real-time order of H is
∅, then, trivially, S preserves the real-time order of H. Since VispS, Tiq contains only H|Ti
and therefore only a single write operation execution and no reads, then it is legal and Ti in
S is legal in S. Furthermore, VispS, Tjq is such that VispS, Tjq “ H|Ti ¨H|Tj and contains a
read operation rjpxq Ñ 1 preceded by the only write operation wipxq1 Ñ ok i, so VispS, Tjq
is legal, and, consequently, Tj in S is legal in S. Thus, all transactions in S are legal in S,
so H is serializable.
Let S1 be a sequential history that extends S in accordance to Def. 12. Since there are
no transactions in S1 that are not in S, then S1 “ S. Thus, since every transaction in S is
legal in S, then every transaction in S1 is legal in S1. Trivially, S1 also preserves the real
time order of S. Therefore, the condition Def. 12a is met. Since there are no local read
operations in S, then condition Def. 12b is trivially met as well. Therefore, H is live opaque.
Since H is both live opaque and contains a transaction that releases early, then the
theorem holds.
Theorem 10. Live opacity does not support overwriting.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there is a history (with unique
writes) H that is live opaque and, from Def. 4, contains some transaction Ti that writes
value v to some variable x and releases x early and subsequently executes another write
operation writing v 1 to x where the second write follows a read operation executed by
transaction Tj reading v from x.
Since H is live opaque there exists a sequential history S that justifies the serializability
of H. There cannot exist a sequential history S where Tj reads from x between two writes
to x executed by Ti, because there cannot exist a legal VispS, Tjq, so Tj would not be legal
in S. Therefore, Tj must be aborted in H and therefore Tj is not in any sequential history
S that justifies the serializability of H.
Since Tj is in H but not in S, then given any sequential extension S
1 of S in accordance
to Def. 12 Tj is replaced in S
1 by T grj which reads v from x and finally commits. However,
since the write operation execution writing v to x in Ti is followed in S
1|Ti by another write
operation execution that writes v 1 to x, then there cannot exist a VispS1, T grj q that is legal.
Thus T grj in S
1 cannot be legal in S1, which contradicts Def. 12a. Thus, H is not live opaque,
which is a contradiction.
Therefore H cannot simultaneously be live opaque and contain a transaction with early
release and overwriting.
Theorem 11. Live opacity does not support aborting early release.
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Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there is a history (with unique
writes) H that is live opaque and, from Def. 5, contains some transaction Ti that writes
value v to some variable x and releases x and subsequently aborts in H.
Let S be any sequential history that justifies the serializability of H, and let S1 be any
sequential extension S1 of S in accordance to Def. 12. Since Ti aborts in H, then it is not
in S, and therefore it is replaced in S1 by T gri . Since, by construction, T
gr
i does not contain
any write operation executions, there is no write operation execution writing v to x in S1.
Since Ti released x early in H there is a transaction Tj in H that executes a read operation
reading v from x and the same read operation is in S1. But since there is no write operation
execution writing v to x in S1, no transaction containing a read operation execution reading
v from x can be legal in S1. Thus, H is not live opaque, which is a contradiction.
Therefore H cannot be simultaneously live opaque and contain a transaction with early
release that aborts.
Like with VWC, live opacity does not allow transactions that release early to abort,
which we consider too strict a condition.
3.6 Elastic Opacity
Elastic opacity is a safety property based on opacity, that was introduced to describe the
safety guarantees of elastic transactions [13]. The property allows to relax the atomicity
requirement of transactions to allow each of them to execute as a series of smaller transac-
tions. An elastic transaction Ti is split into a sequence of subhistories called a cut denoted
CipHq, where each subhistory represents a ”subtransaction.” In brief, a cut that contains
more than one operation execution is well-formed if all subhistories are longer than one op-
eration execution, all the write operations are in the same subhistory, and the first operation
execution on any variable in every subhistory is not a write operation, except possibly in
the first subhistory. A well-formed cut of some transaction Ti is consistent in some history
H, if given any two operation executions opi and op
1
i on x in any subhistories of the cut,
no transaction Tj (i ‰ j) executes a write operation opj on x s.t. opi ăH opj ăH op1i. In
addition, given any two operation executions opi and op
1
i on x, y respectively, no two trans-
actions Tk, Tl (l ‰ i, k ‰ i) execute writes opk on x and opl on y, s.t. opi ăH opk ăH op1i
and opi ăH opl ăH op1i. A cutting function fC takes a history H as an argument and
produces a new history Hf where for each transaction Ti P H declared as elastic, Ti is
replaced in Hf with the transactions resulting from the cut CipHq of Ti. If some transaction
is committed (aborted) in H, then all transactions resulting from its cut are committed
(aborted) in fCpHq. Then, elastic opacity is defined as follows:
Definition 13 (Elastic Opacity). History H is elastic opaque iff there exists a cutting
function fC that replaces each elastic transaction Ti in H with its consistent cut CipHq, such
that history fCpHq is opaque.
Theorem 12. Elastic opacity supports early release.
Proof. Let H be a transactional history with unique writes as shown in Fig. 6. Let Ti be
an elastic transaction. Let CipHq be a cut of subhistory H|Ti, such that:
CipHq “ trstart i1 Ñ ok i1 , ri1pyq Ñ 0,wi1pxq1 Ñ ok i1 , tryC i1 Ñ Ci1s,
rstart i2 Ñ ok i2 , ri2pxq Ñ 1, ri2pyq Ñ 0, tryC i2 Ñ Ci2su.
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Ti
start i ripyq0 wipxq1 ripxq1 ripyq0 tryC iÑCi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryC jÑCj
Figure 6: Elastic opaque history with early release.
Ti1
start i1 ri1pyq0 wi1pxq1 tryC i1ÑCi1
Ti2
start i2 ri2pxq1 ri2pyq0 tryC i2ÑCi2
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryC jÑCj
Figure 7: History after applying a cutting function.
All subhistories of CipHq are longer than one operation, all the writes are in the first sub-
history, and no subhistory starts with a write, so CipHq is well-formed. Since there are no
write operations outside of Ti, then it follows that CipHq is a consistent cut in H. Let fC
be any cutting function such that it cuts Ti according to CipHq, in which case fCpHq is
defined as in Fig. 7. Let S be a sequential history s.t. S “ fCpHq|Ti1 ¨ fCpHq|Tj ¨ fCpHq|Ti2 .
Since Ti1 precedes Ti2 in S as well as in fCpHq, and all other transactions are not real time
ordered, S preserves the real time order of fCpHq. Trivially, each transaction in S is legal
in S. Thus, fCpHq is opaque by Def. 8, and in effect H is elastic opaque by Def. 13. Since
in H transaction Tj reads x from Ti while Ti is live, then, by Def. 2, Ti releases x early in
x. Hence, since H is elastic opaque, elastic opacity supports early release, by Def. 3.
Theorem 13. Elastic opacity does not support overwriting.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there is an elastic opaque history H
s.t. transaction Ti writes value v to some variable x and releases it early in H. Furthermore,
let us assume that there is overwriting, so after some transaction Tj reads v from x, Ti writes
u to x. Since only elastic transactions can release early in elastic opaque histories, and Ti
releases early, Ti is necessarily elastic. Thus, in any fCpHq Ti is replaced by a cut CipHq.
The two writes on x in Ti are either a) in two different subhistories in CHpiq, or b) in
the same subhistory in CHpiq. Since the definition of a consistent cut requires all writes on
a single variable are within one subhistory of the cut, then in case (a), CHpiq is inconsistent.
Since by Def. 13 elastic opaque histories are created using consistent cuts, then H is not
elastic opaque, which is a contradiction.
In the case of (b), let us say that both writes are in a subhistory that is converted into
transaction T 1i in fCpHq. Since Ti releases x early, then by Def. 2, there is a transaction
T 1j in fCpHq which executes a read on x reading the value written by T 1i in fCpHq. Since
we assume overwriting, the read operation on x in T 1j reads the value written by the first
of the two writes in T 1i and does so before the other write on x is performed within CHpiq.
Then, in any sequential history S equivalent to fCpHq either T 1j ăS T 1i or T 1i ăS T 1j . In the
former case T 1j in S is not legal in S, since the read on x that yields value v will not be
preceded by any operation that writes v to x in any possible VispS, T 1j ,). In the latter case
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T 1j in S is also not legal in S, since there will be a write operation writing u to x between
the read on x that yields value v and any operation that writes v to x in VispS, T 1j ,). Since
T 1j in S is not legal in any S equivalent to fCpHq, then, by Def. 7, fCpHq is not final-state
opaque, and hence, by Def. 8, not opaque. In effect, by Def. 13, H is not opaque, which is
a contradiction.
Thus, there cannot be an elastic opaque history H with overwriting.
Theorem 14. Elastic opacity does not support early release aborting.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there is an elastic opaque history
H s.t. transaction Ti releases some variable x early in H and aborts. Since Ti releases early
then it writes v to x, and there is another Tj that executes a read on x that returns v before
Ti aborts. Since only elastic transactions can release early in elastic opaque histories, and
Ti releases early, Ti is necessarily elastic. If Ti aborts in H, then all of the transactions
resulting from its cut CipHq in fCpHq also abort (by construction of fCpHq). Therefore,
for any sequential history S equivalent to fCpHq, there is no subhistory H 1 P CipHq s.t.
H 1 Ď VispS, Tjq, and in effect the read operation in Tj on x reading v is not preceded by a
write operation writing v to x. Therefore, VispS, Tjq is illegal, so Tj in S is not legal in S,
and thus, by Def. 8 fCpHq is not opaque. Since fCpHq is not opaque, then by Def. 13, H is
not elastic opaque, which is a contradiction.
Elastic opacity supports early release, but, since it does not guarantee serializability
(as shown in [13]), we consider it to be a relatively weak property. This is contrary to our
premise of finding a property that allows early release and provides stronger guarantees than
serializability. Elastic transactions were proposed as an alternative to traditional transac-
tions for implementing search structures, but we submit that the restrictions placed on the
composition of elastic transactions and the need for transactions with early release to be
non-aborting put an unnecessary burden on general-purpose TM. In particular, for a cut to
be well-formed, it is necessary that all writes are executed in the same subtransaction, and
that no subtransaction starts with a write, which severely limits how early release can be
used and precludes scenarios that are nevertheless intuitively correct. In addition, elastic
opacity requires that transactions which release early do not subsequently abort.
3.7 Database Properties
We follow the discussion of TM safety properties with a brief foray into database properties
that deal with transaction consistency. Given that TM properties tend not to be very helpful
when describing the behavior of early release, these consistency properties may be used to
supplement that.
Recoverability is a database property defined as below (following [16]):
Definition 14 (Recoverability). History H is recoverable iff for any Ti, Tj P H, s.t. i ‰ j
and Tj reads from Ti, Ti commits in H before Tj commits.
Recoverability does not make requirements about values read by transactions, so it
necessarily supports early release, overwriting, and aborting early release. It also allows
histories that are not even serializable. As such, it is too weak for application in TM.
Recoverability can be combined with serializability to restrict the order on commits and
aborts in serializable histories. The resulting consistency condition is therefore stronger
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than serializability. However, it still allows unrestricted early release, overwriting, and
aborting early release, and thus is not suitable for TM.
Avoiding cascading aborts (ACA) [7] is a database property defined as:
Definition 15 (Avoiding Cascading Aborts). History H Avoids Cascading Aborts iff for
any Ti, Tj P H s.t. i ‰ j and Tj reads from Ti, Ti commits before the read.
As with recoverability, ACA restricts reading from live transactions. Therefore, ACA
clearly removes all the scenarios encompassed by Def. 2. Since this is the only provision of
ACA, the property forbids early release, without giving any additional guarantees. Hence,
it also does not support overwriting nor aborting early release.
Strictness [7] is a database property defined as:
Definition 16 (Strictness). History H is strict iff for any Ti, Tj P H (i ‰ j) and given any
operation execution opi “ ripxq Ñ v or wipxqv1 Ñ ok i in H|Ti, and any operation execution
opj “ wjpxqv Ñ ok j in H|Tj, if opi follows opj, then Tj commits or aborts before opi.
The definition unequivocally states that a transaction cannot read from another trans-
action, until the latter is committed or aborted. Thus, strictness precludes early release
altogether. Hence, it also does not support overwriting nor aborting early release.
Rigorousness is defined (following [9]) as:
Definition 17 (Rigorousness). History H is rigorous iff it is strict and for any Ti, Tj P H
(i ‰ j) such that Ti writes to variable x, i.e., opi “ wipxqv Ñ ok i P H|Ti after Tj reads x,
then Tj commits or aborts before opi.
Since in [4] the authors demonstrate that rigorous histories are opaque, and since we
show in Theorem 4 that opaque histories do not support early release, then neither does
rigorousness. Hence, it also does not support overwriting nor aborting early release.
3.8 Discussion
The survey of properties shows that, while there are many safety properties for TM with
a wide range of guarantees they provide, with respect to early release they fall into three
basic groups.
The first group consists of properties that allow early release but do not prevent overwrit-
ing: serializability and recoverability. These properties do not control what can be seen by
aborting transactions. As argued in [15], this is insufficient for TM in general, because op-
erating on inconsistent state may lead to uncontrollable errors, whose consequences include
crashing the process.
The second group consists of properties that preclude the dangerous situations allowed
by the first group. This group includes opacity, TMS1, TMS2, ACA, strictness, and rigor-
ousness. The properties in this group forbid early release altogether and obviously are not
suited for TM systems that employ that mechanism.
The third group allows early release and precludes overwriting but also precludes abort-
ing in transactions that release early. It includes live opacity, elastic opacity, and VWC.
These properties seem to provide a reasonable middle ground between allowing early re-
lease and eliminating inconsistent views. However, these properties effectively require that
transactions that release early become irrevocable. That is, once a live transaction is read
from, it can never abort. The need to deal with irrevocable transactions is detrimental,
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P1: 1 transaction { // spawns as T1
2 x = 1;
3 if (y > 0)
4 x = x + y;
5 y = x + 1;
6 }
P2: 1 transaction { // spawns as T2
2 y = y + 1;
3 }
Figure 8: Transactional program with closing write.
because irrevocable transactions introduce additional complexity to a TM (see e.g., [37]).
In addition, in applications like distributed computing, transaction aborts may be induced
by external stimuli, so it can be completely impossible to prevent transactions from abort-
ing [30]. Finally, the requirement to have transactions that release early eventually commit
unnecessarily precludes some intuitively correct histories (see Fig. 3).
In summary, properties from the first group are not adequate for any TM and those
from the second group do not allow any form of early release. The third group imposes
an overstrict restriction that transactions which release early be irrevocable. None of the
properties provide a satisfactory, strong safety property that could be used for a TM with
early release, where aborts cannot be arbitrarily restricted. Therefore, a property expressing
the guarantees of such systems is lacking. Hence, we introduce a property in Section 4 to
fill this niche.
4 Last-use Opacity
We present last-use opacity, a new TM safety property that provides strong consistency
guarantees and allows early release without compromising on the ability of transactions to
abort. The property is based on the preliminary work in [32, 33].
The idea of last-use opacity hinges on identifying the closing write operation execution
on a given variable in individual transactions. Informally, a closing write on some variable
is such, that the transaction which executed it will not subsequently execute another write
operation on the same variable in any possible extension of the history. What is possible
is determined by the program that is being evaluated to create that history. Knowing the
program, it is possible to infer (to an extent) what operations a particular transaction will
execute. Hence, knowing the program, we can determine whether a particular operation on
some variable is the last possible such operation on that variable within a given transac-
tion. Thus, we can determine whether a given operation is the closing write operation in a
transaction.
Take, for instance, the program in Fig. 8, where subprogram P1 spawns transaction T1,
and P2 spawns T2. Let us assume that initially x and y are set to 0. Depending on the
semantics of the TM, as these subprograms interweave during the execution, a number of
histories can be produced. We can divide all of among them into two cases. In the first
case T2 writes 1 to y in line 2 of P2 and this value is then read by T1 in line 3 of P1. As
a consequence, T1 will execute the write operation in line 4. The second case assumes that
T1 reads 0 in line 3 of P1 (e.g., because T2 executed line 2 much later). In this case, T1 will
not execute the write operation in line 4. We can see, however, that in either of the above
cases, once T1 executes the write to x on line 4, then no further writes to x will follow in T1
in any conceivable history. Thus, the write operation execution generated by line 4 of P1 is
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the closing write on x in T1. On the other hand, the write operation execution generated by
line 2 of P1 is never the closing write on x in T1, because there exists a conceivable history
where another write operation execution will appear (i.e., once line 4 is evaluated). This is
true even in the second of the cases because line 4 can be executed in potentia, even if it is
not executed de facto.
Note that once any transaction Ti completes executing its closing write on some variable
x, it is certain that no further modifications to that variable are intended by the programmer
as part of Ti. This means, from the perspective of Ti (and assuming no other transaction
modifies x), that the state of x would be the same at the time of the closing write as if the
transaction attempted to commit. Hence, with respect to x, we can treat Ti as if it had
attempted to commit.
Last use opacity uses the concept of a closing write to dictate one transaction can read
from another transaction. We give a formal definition in Section 4.1, but, in short, given
any two transactions, Ti and Tj , last-use opacity allows Ti to read variable x from Tj if the
latter is either committed or commit-pending, or, if Tj is live and it already executed its
closing write on x. This has the benefit of allowing early release while excluding overwriting
completely. However, last-use opacity does allow cascading aborts to occur. We discuss
their implications in Section 4.3, as well as ways of mitigating them. That section also
describes the guarantees given by last-use opacity.
4.1 Definition
First, we define the concept of a closing write to some variable by a particular transaction.
We do this by first defining a closing write operation invocation, and then extend the
definition to complete operation executions.
Given program P and a set of processes Π executing P, since different interleavings of
Π cause an execution EpP,Πq to produce different histories, then let HP,Π be the set of all
possible histories that can be produced by EpP,Πq, i.e., HP,Π is the largest possible set s.t.
HP,Π “ tH | H |ù EpP,Πqu.
Definition 18 (Closing Write Invocation). Given a program P, a set of processes Π ex-
ecuting P and a history H s.t. H |ù EpP,Πq, i.e. H P HP,Π, an invocation inv ipw pxqvq
is the closing write invocation on some variable x by transaction Ti in H, if for any his-
tory H 1 P HP,Π for which H is a prefix (i.e., H 1 “ H ¨ R) there is no operation invocation
inv ipw pxquq s.t. inv ipw pxqvq precedes inv ipw pxquq in H 1|Ti.
Definition 19 (Closing Write). Given a program P, a set of processes Π executing P and
a history H s.t. H |ù EpP,Πq, an operation execution is the closing write on some variable
x by transaction Ti in H if it comprises of an invocation and a response other than Ai, and
the invocation is the closing write invocation on x by Ti in H.
The closing read invocation and the closing read are defined analogously.
If a transaction executes its closing write on some variable, we say that the transaction
decided on x.
Definition 20 (Transaction Decided on x). Given a program P, a set of processes Π and a
history H s.t. H |ù EpP,Πq, we say transaction Ti P H decided on variable x in H iff H|Ti
contains a complete write operation execution wipxqv Ñ ok i that is the closing write on x.
Given some history H, let TˆH be a set of transactions s.t. Ti P TˆH iff there is some
variable x s.t. Ti decided on x in H.
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Given any Ti P H, a decided transaction subhistory, denoted H |ˆTi, is the longest subse-
quence of H|Ti s.t.:
a) H |ˆTi contains start i Ñ u, and
b) for any variable x, if Ti decided on x in H, then H |ˆTi contains pH|Tiq|x.
In addition, a decided transaction subhistory completion, denoted H
˛|Ti, is a sequence s.t.
H
˛|Ti “ H |ˆTi ¨ rtryC i Ñ Cis.
Given a sequential history S s.t. S ” H, LVispS, Tiq is the longest subhistory of S, s.t.
for each Tj P S:
a) if i “ j or Tj is committed in S and Tj ăS Ti, then S|Tj Ď LVispS, Tiq,
b) if Tj is not committed in S but Tj P TˆH and Tj ăS Ti, and it is not true that Tj ăH Ti,
then either S
˛|Tj Ď LVispS, Tiq or not.
Given a sequential history S and a transaction Ti P S, we then say that transaction Ti
is last-use legal in S if LVispS, Tiq is legal. Note that if S is legal, then it is also last-use
legal (see appendix for proof).
Definition 21 (Final-state Last-use Opacity). A finite history H is final-state last-use
opaque if, and only if, there exists a sequential history S equivalent to any completion of H
s.t.,
a) S preserves the real-time order of H,
b) every transaction in S that is committed in S is legal in S,
c) every transaction in S that is not committed in S is last-use legal in S.
Definition 22 (Last-use Opacity). A history H is last-use opaque if, and only if, every
finite prefix of H is final-state last-use opaque.
Theorem 15. Last-use opacity is a safety property.
Proof. By Def. 22, last-use opacity is trivially prefix-closed.
Given HL that is an infinite limit of any sequence of finite histories H0, H1, ..., s.t every
Hh in the sequence is last-use–opaque and every Hh is a prefix of Hh`1, since each prefix Hh
of HL is last-use–opaque, then, by extension, every prefix Hh of HL is also final-state last-use
opaque, so, by Def. 22, HL is last-use–opaque. Hence, last-use opacity is limit-closed.
Since last-use opacity is both prefix-closed and limit-closed, then, by Def. 1, it is a safety
property.
4.2 Examples
In order to aid understanding of the property we present examples of last-use opaque histo-
ries in Fig. 9–12. These are contrasted by examples of histories that are not last-use opaque
in Fig. 14–17. We discuss the examples below and prove them in the appendix.
The example in Fig. 9 shows Ti executing a write on x once and releasing x early to
Tj . We assume that the program generating the history is such, that the write operation
executed by Ti is the closing write operation execution on x. The history is intuitively
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Ti
start i wipxq1 tryC iÑCi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryC jÑCj
Figure 9: Example satisfying last-use opacity: early release. We mark a closing write
operation execution in some history in the diagram as . Note that an operation can be
the ultimate operation execution in some transaction, but still not fit the definition of a
closing operation execution.
Ti
start i wipxq1 tryC iÑCi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryAjÑAj
Figure 10: Example satisfying last-use opacity: early release to an aborting transaction.
Ti
start i wipxq1 tryAiÑAi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryAjÑAj
Figure 11: Example satisfying last-use opacity: early release between two aborting trans-
actions.
Ti
start i wipxq1 tryC iÑCi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryAjÑAj
Figure 12: Example satisfying last-use opacity: early release to a prematurely aborting
transaction.
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Ti
start i wipxq1 tryAiÑAi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 wjpxq2
Tk
startk rkpxq0
Figure 13: Example satisfying last-use opacity: freedom to read from or ignore an aborted
transaction.
Ti
start i wipxq1 tryC iÑCi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryC jÑCj
Figure 14: Example breaking last-use opacity: early release before closing write operation
execution.
Ti
start i wipxq1 tryAiÑAi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryAjÑAj
Figure 15: Example breaking last-use opacity: early release between two aborting transac-
tions before closing write operation execution.
Ti
start i wipxq1 tryC iÑCi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryC jÑCj
Figure 16: Example breaking last-use opacity: commit order not respected.
Ti
start i wipxq1 wipxq2 tryC iÑCi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryC jÑCj
Figure 17: Example breaking last-use opacity: early release with overwriting.
25
Ti
start i wipxq1 ripyq1
Tj
startj rjpxq1 wjpyq1
Figure 18: Example breaking last-use opacity: dependency cycle.
correct, since both transactions commit, and Tj reads a value written by Ti. On the formal
side, since both transactions are committed in this history, the equivalent sequential history
would consist of all the events in Ti followed by the events in Tj and both transactions would
be legal, since Ti writes a legal value to x and Tj reads the last value written by Ti to x.
Thus, the history is final-state last-use opaque.
Since last-use opacity requires prefix closedness, then all prefixes of the history in Fig. 9
also need to be final-state last-use opaque. We present only two of the interesting prefixes,
since the remainder are either similar or trivial. The first interesting prefix is created
by removing the commit operation execution from Tj , which means Tj is aborted in any
completion of the history. We show such a completion in Fig. 10. Still, Ti writes a legal
value to x and Tj reads the last value written by Ti to x, so that prefix is also final-state
last-use opaque. Another interesting prefix is created by removing the commit operation
executions from both transactions. Then, in the completion of the history both transactions
are aborted, as in Fig. 11. Then, in an equivalent sequential history Tj would read a value
written by an aborted transaction. In order to show legality of a committed transaction,
we use the subhistory denoted Vis, which does not contain any transactions that were not
committed in the history from which it was derived. Thus, if Tj were committed, it would
not be legal, since its Vis would not contain a write operation execution writing the value
the transaction actually read. However, since Tj is aborted, the definition of final-state last-
use opacity only requires that LVis rather than Vis be legal, and LVis can contain operation
executions on particular variables from an aborted transaction under the condition that the
transaction already executed its closing write on the variables in question. Since, in the
example Ti executed its closing write on x, then this write will be included in LVis for Tj ,
so Tj will be last-use legal. In consequence the prefix is also final-state last-use opaque.
Indeed, all prefixes of example Fig. 9 are final-state last-use opaque, so the example is
last-use opaque, and, by extension, so are the examples in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11.
Contrast the example in Fig. 9 with the one in Fig. 14. The histories presented in
both are identical, with the exception that the write operation in Fig. 9 is considered to
be the closing operation execution, while in Fig. 14 it is not. The difference would stem
from differences in the programs that produced these histories. For instance, the program
producing the history in Fig. 14 could conditionally execute another operation on x, so,
even though that condition was not met in this history, the potential of another write on
x means that the existing write cannot be considered a closing write operation execution.
The consequence of this is that while the example itself is final-state last-use opaque, one
of its prefixes is not, so the history is not last-use opaque. The offending prefix is created
by removing commit operations in both transactions, so both transactions would abort in
any completion, as in Fig. 15. Here, since Ti does not execute the closing write operation
on x, then the write operation would not be included in LVis for Tj , so the value read by
Tj could not be justified. Thus, Tj is not legal in that history, and, therefore, the history
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in Fig. 15 is not final-state last-use opaque (so also not last-use opaque). Fig. 15 represents
the completion of a prefix of the history in Fig. 14, so Fig. 15 not being final-state last-use
opaque, means that Fig. 14 is not last-use opaque.
The examples in Fig. 12 and Fig. 16, show that recoverability is required, i.e., transactions
must commit in order. Last-use opacity of the example in Fig. 12 is analogous to the one in
Fig. 10, since their equivalent sequential histories are identical, as are the sequential histories
equivalent to their prefixes. Furthermore, intuitively, if Tj reads a value of a variable released
early by Ti and aborts before Ti commits, this is correct behavior. On the other hand, the
history in Fig. 16 is not last-use opaque, even though it is final-state last-use opaque (by
analogy to Fig. 9). However, a prefix of the history where the commit operation execution is
removed from Ti is not final-state last-use opaque. This is because a completion will require
that Ti be aborted, the operations executed by Ti are not going to be included in any Vis.
Since Tj is committed, then its Vis must be legal, but it is not, because the read operation
reading 1 will not be preceded by any writes in Vis. Since the prefix contains an illegal
transaction, then it is not final-state last-use opaque, and thus, the history in Fig. 16 is not
last-use opaque.
The example in Fig. 13 shows that a transaction is allowed to read from a transaction
that eventually aborts, or ignore that transaction, because of the freedom left within the
definition of LVis. I.e. transactions Tj is concurrent to Ti, but Tk follows Ti in real time. Ti
executes a closing write on x, so Tj is allowed to include the write operation on in its LVis.
Since Tj sees the value written to x by that write, Tj includes the write in LVis. On the
other hand, Tk cannot include Ti’s write in LVisp,,) since it aborted before Tk even started,
so the write should not be visible to Tk. On the other hand Tk is allowed to include Tj in
its LVis. Tk should not do so, however, since it ignores Tj as well as Ti (which makes sense
as Tj is doomed to abort). Hence Tk reads the value of x to be 0. If Tj is included in Tk’s
LVis, reading 0 would be incorrect. Hence, the definition of LVis allows Tj to be arbitrarily
excluded. In effect all three transactions are correct (so long as Tj does not eventually
commit).
Fig. 17 shows an example of overwriting, which is not last-use opaque, since there is no
equivalent sequential history where the write operation in Ti writing 1 to x would precede
the read operation in Tj reading 1 from x without the other write operation writing 2 to
x also preceding the read. Thus, in all cases Tj is not legal, and the history is neither
final-state last-use opaque, nor last-use opaque.
Finally, Fig. 18 shows an example of a cyclic dependency, where Tj reads x from Ti,
and subsequently Ti reads y from Tj . Both writes in the history are closing writes. This
example has unfinished transactions, which are thus aborted in any possible completion of
this history. There are two possible sequential histories equivalent to that completion: one
where Ti precedes Tj and one where Tj precedes Ti. In the former case, LVis of Ti does not
contain any operations from Tj , because Tj follows Ti. Thus, there is no write operation on
y preceding a read on y returning 1 in Ti’s LVis, which does not conform to the sequential
specification, so Ti’s LVis is not legal. Hence, Ti is not legal in that scenario. The former
case is analogous: Tj ’s LVis will not contain a write operation from Ti, because Ti follows
Tj . Therefore Tj ’s LVis contains a read on x that returns 1, which is not preceded by any
write on x, which causes the sequence not to conform to the sequential specification and
renders the transaction not legal. Since either case contains a transaction that is not legal,
then that history is not final-state last-use opaque, and therefore not last-use opaque.
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4.3 Guarantees
Last-use opacity gives the programmer the following guarantees:
Serializability If a transaction commits, then the value it reads can be explained by oper-
ations executed by preceding or concurrent transactions. This guarantees that a transaction
that views inconsistent state will not commit.
Lemma 1. Every last-use–opaque history is serializable.
We provide the proof for Lemma 10.
Real-time Order Successive transactions will not be rearranged to fit serializability, so
a correct history will agree with an external clock, or an external order of events.
Lemma 2. Every last-use–opaque history preserves real-time order.
Proof. Trivially from Def. 22 and Def. 21a.
Recoverability If one transaction reads from another transaction, the former will commit
only after the latter commits. This guarantees that transactions commit in order.
Lemma 3. Every last-use–opaque history is recoverable.
We provide the proof in Appendix B.
Precluding Overwriting If transaction Ti reads the value of some variable written by
transaction Tj , then Tj will never subsequently modify that variable.
Lemma 4. Last-use opacity does not support overwriting.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction let us assume that there exists H that is a last-use–
opaque history with overwriting, i.e. (from Def. 4) there are transaction Ti and Tj s.t.:
a) Ti releases some variable x early,
b) H|Ti contains wipxqv Ñ ok i and wipxqv 1 Ñ ok i, s.t. the former precedes the latter in
H|Ti,
c) H|Tj contains rjpxq Ñ v that precedes wipxqv 1 Ñ ok i in H.
Since H is opaque, then there is a completion C “ ComplpHq and a sequential history S s.t.
S ” H, S preserves the real-time order of H, and both Ti and Tj in S are legal in S. In S,
either Ti ăS Tj or Tj ăS Ti. In either case, any VispS, Tjq or LVispS, Tjq by their definitions
will contain either the sequence of both wipxqv Ñ ok i and wipxqv 1 Ñ ok i or neither of those
write operation executions. In either case, rjpxq Ñ v will not be directly preceded by
wipxqv Ñ ok i among operations on x in either VispS, Tjq or LVispS, Tjq. Therefore, Tj in
S cannot be legal in S, which is a contradiction.
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1 // invariant: x ě 0
2 transaction {
3 x = y - 1;
4 if (x < 0)
5 abort();
6 }
1 // invariant: x ě 0
2 transaction {
3 *(_array + x);
4 }
Figure 19: Abort example. Figure 20: Memory error example.
Ti
start i ripyq0 wipxq -1 ripxq -1 tryAiÑAi
Tj
startj rjpxq -1
Figure 21: Last-use opaque history with inconsistent view.
Aborting Early Release A transaction can release some variable early and subsequently
abort.
Lemma 5. Last-use opacity supports aborting early release.
Proof. Let H be the history depicted in Fig. 11. Here, Ti releases x early to Tj and sub-
sequently aborts, which satisfies Def. 5. Since Ti and Tj are both aborted in H, H has a
completion C “ ComplpHq “ H. Let S be a sequential history s.t. S “ H|Ti ¨ H|Tj . S
vacuously preserves the real-time order of H and trivially S ” H. Transaction Ti in S is
last-use legal in S, because LVispS, Tiq “ H
˛|Ti whose operations on x are limited to a single
write operation execution is within the sequential specification of x. Transaction Tj in S
is also last-use legal in S, since LVispS, Tjq “ H
˛|Ti ¨H
˛|Tj whose operations on x consist of
wipxqv Ñ ok i followed by rjpxq Ñ v is also within the sequential specification of x. Since
both Ti and Tj in S are last-use legal in S, H is final-state last-use opaque. All prefixes
of H are trivially also final-state last-use opaque (since either their completion is the same
as H’s, they contain only a single write operation execution on x, or contain no operation
executions on variables), so H is last-use opaque.
Exclusive Access Any transaction has effectively exclusive access to any variable it ac-
cesses, at minimum, from the first to the final modification it performs, regardless of whether
it eventually commits or aborts.
Lemma 6. Any transaction in any last-use–opaque history has exclusive access to any
variable between first and last access to.
Proof. From Lemma 1 and Lemma 4.
However, last-use opacity does not preclude transactions from aborting after releasing
a variable early. As a consequence there may be instances of cascading aborts, which have
varying implications on consistency depending on whether the TM model allows transactions
to abort programmatically. We distinguish three cases of models and discuss them below.
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Only Forced Aborts Let us assume that transactions cannot arbitrarily abort, but only
do so as a result of receiving an abort response to invoking a read or write operation, or
while attempting to commit. In other words, there is no tryA operation in the transactional
API. In that case, since overwriting is not allowed, the transaction never reveals intermediate
values of variables to other transactions. This means, that if a transaction released a variable
early, then the programmer did not intend to change the value of that variable. So, if the
transaction eventually committed, the value of the variable would have been the same. So,
if the transaction is eventually forced to abort rather than committing, the value of any
variable released early would be the same regardless of whether the transaction committed
or aborted. Therefore, we can consider the inconsistent state to be safe. In other words, if
the variable caused an error to occur, the error would be caused regardless of whether the
transaction finally aborts or commits. Thus, we can say that with this set of assumptions,
the programmer is guaranteed that none of the inconsistent views will cause unexpected
behavior, even if cascading aborts are possible. Note that the use of this model is not
uncommon (see eg. [13, 2, 3]).
Programmer-initiated Aborts Alternatively, let us assume that transactions can arbi-
trarily abort (in addition to forced aborts as described above) by executing the operation
tryA as a result of some instruction in the program. In that case it is possible to imagine
programs that use the abort instruction to cancel transaction due to the ”business logic”
of the program. Therefore a programmer explicitly specifies that the value of a variable is
different depending on whether the transaction finally commits or not. An example of such
a program is given in Fig. 19. Here, the programmer enforced an invariant that the value
of x should never be less than zero. If the invariant is not fulfilled, the transaction aborts.
However, writing a value to x that breaks the invariant is the closing write operation execu-
tion for this program, so it is possible that another transaction reads the value of x before
the transaction aborts. If the transaction that reads x is like the one in Fig. 20, where x is
used to index an array via pointer arithmetic, a memory error is possible. Nevertheless, the
history from Fig. 21 that corresponds to a problematic execution of these two transactions
is clearly allowed by last-use opacity (assuming that the domain of x is Z). Thus, if the
abort operation is available to the programmer the guarantee that inconsistent views will
not lead to unexpected effects is lost. Therefore it is up to the programmer to use aborts
wisely or to prevent inconsistent views from causing problems, by prechecking invariants at
the outset of a transaction, or maintaining invariants also within a transaction (in a similar
way as with monitor invariants). Alternatively, a mechanism can be built into the TM that
prevents specific transactions at risk from reading variables that were released early, while
other transactions are allowed to do so. However, if these workarounds are not satisfactory,
we present a stronger variant of last-use opacity in Section 4.5 that deals specifically with
this model and eliminates its inconsistent views.
Arbitrary Aborts We present a third alternative to aborts in transactions: a compromise
between only forced aborts and programmer-initiated aborts. This option assumes that the
tryA operation is not available to the programmer, so it cannot be used to implement
business logic. However, we allow the TM system to somehow inject tryA operations in
the code in response to external stimuli, such as crashes or exceptions and use aborts as a
fault tolerance mechanism. However, since the programmer cannot use the operation, the
programs must be coded as in the forced aborts case, and therefore the same guarantees are
given.
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Htms2 Ă Hlop
Hop Ă Hlop
Hrig Ă Hlop
Hlvop Ă Hlop
Hrec Ą Hlop
Hser Ą Hlop
Htms1 Ć Hlop ^ Htms1 Č Hlop
Heop Ć Hlop ^ Heop Č Hlop
Hstr Ć Hlop ^ Hstr Č Hlop
Hvwc Ć Hlop ^ Hvwc Č Hlop
Haca Ć Hlop ^ Haca Č Hlop
Figure 22: Last-use opaque histories Hlop in relation to: TMS2 and TMS1 histories Htms2,
Htms1, opaque histories Hop, elastic opaque histories Heop, rigorous histories Hrig, strict his-
tories Hstr, live opaque histories Hlvop, virtual world consistent histories Hvwc, recoverable
histories Hrec, histories avoiding cascading abort Haca, and serializable histories Hser.
4.4 Last-use Opacity in Context
We compare last-use opacity with other safety properties with respect to their relative
strength. Given two properties P1 and P2 and the set of all histories that satisfy each
property H1, H2, respectively. P1 is stronger than P2 if H1 Ă H2 (so P2 is weaker than
P1). If neither H1 Ă H2 nor H1 Ą H2, then the properties are incomparable.
We present the result of the comparison in Fig. 22. We describe the comparison with
opacity and serializability in particular below, and provide proofs for the comparison of the
remaining properties in the appendix.
Opacity is strictly stronger than last-use opacity.
Lemma 7. For any history S and transaction Ti P S, if VispS, Tiq is legal, then LVispS, Tiq
is legal.
sketch. By definition of VispS, Tiq, if operation op P VispS, Tiq, then op P VispS, Tiq only if
op P H|Tj and either i “ j or Tj ăS Ti and Tj is committed. By definition of LVispS, Tiq,
given transactions Ti, Tj and operation op P S|Tj , if i “ j or Tj ăS Ti and Tj is com-
mitted, then S|Tj Ď LVispS, Tiq. Therefore LVispS, Tiq ” VispS, Tiq. Since VispS, Tiq and
LVispS, Tiq preserve the order of operations in S, then LVispS, Tiq “ VispS, Tiq. Hence, if
VispS, Tiq is legal, then LVispS, Tiq is legal.
Lemma 8. Any final-state last-use opaque history H is final-state last-use–opaque.
sketch. From Def. 7, for any final-state opaque history H, there is a sequential history
S ” ComplpHq s.t. S preserves the real time order of H and every transaction Ti in S
is legal in S. Thus, for every transaction Ti in S VispS, Tiq is legal. From the definition
of completion, any Ti is either committed or aborted in ComplpHq and therefore likewise
completed or aborted in S. If Ti is committed in S, then it is legal in S, so VispS, Tiq is
legal, and therefore Ti is last-use legal in S. If Ti is aborted in S, then it is legal in S, so
VispS, Tiq is legal, and therefore, from Lemma 7, LVispS, Tiq is also legal, so Ti is last-use
legal in S. Given that all transactions in S are last-use legal in S, then, from Def. 21, H is
final-state last-use opaque.
Lemma 9. Any opaque history H is last-use–opaque.
Proof. If H is opaque, then, from Def. 8, any prefix P of H is final-state opaque. Since any
prefix P of H is final-state opaque, then, from Lemma 8, any P is also final-state last-use
opaque. Then, by Def. 22 H is last-use opaque.
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Last-use opacity is strictly stronger than serializability.
Lemma 10. Any last-use–opaque history H is serializable.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction let us assume that H is last-use–opaque and not serial-
izable. Since H is last-use–opaque, then from Def. 22 H is also final-state last-use opaque.
Then, from Def. 21 there exists a completion HC “ ComplpHq such that there is a sequen-
tial history S s.t. S ” HC , S preserves the real-time order of HC , and any committed
transaction in S is legal in S. However, since H is not serializable, then from Def. 6 there
does not exist a completion HC “ ComplpHq such that there is a sequential history S s.t.
S ” HC , and any committed transaction in S is legal in S. This contradicts the previous
statement.
4.5 Last-use Opacity Variant for the Programmer Initiated Abort
Model
Even though last-use opacity prevents inconsistent views in the only forced aborts and
arbitrary aborts models, it does not prevent inconsistent views in the programmer initiated
aborts model. Hence, we present a variant of last-use opacity called β–last-use opacity (βlu
opacity) that extends the definition of a closing write operation to take tryA operations into
account, as if it was an operation that modifies a given variable.
Definition 23 (β-Closing Write Invocation). Given a program P, a set of processes Π
executing P and a history H s.t. H |ù EpP,Πq, i.e. H P HP,Π, an invocation inv ipw pxqvq is
the closing write invocation on some variable x by transaction Ti in H, if for any history
H 1 P HP,Π for which H is a prefix (i.e., H 1 “ H ¨R) there is no operation invocation inv 1 s.t.
inv ipw pxqvq precedes inv 1 in H 1|Ti where (a) inv 1 “ inv ipw pxquq or (b) inv 1 “ inv iptryAq.
The remainder of the definitions of βlu opacity are formed by analogy to their counter-
parts in last-use opacity. We only summarize them here and give their full versions in the
appendix.
The definition of a β-closing write operation execution is analogous to that of closing
write operation execution Def. 19. The β-closing write is used instead of the closing write
to define a transaction β-decided on x in analogy to Def. 20. Then, that definition is used to
define TˆHβ , H |ˆβTj , and H
˛|βTj by analogy to TˆH , H |ˆTj and H
˛|Tj . Next, those definitions are
used to define βLVis by analogy to LVis. Finally, we say a transaction Ti is β–last-use legal
in some sequential history S if βLVispS, Tiq is legal. This allows us to define βlu opacity as
follows.
Definition 24 (Final-state β–Last-use Opacity). A finite history H is final-state β–last-use
opaque if, and only if, there exists a sequential history S equivalent to any completion of H
s.t.,
a) S preserves the real-time order of H,
b) every transaction in S that is committed in S is legal in S,
c) every transaction in S that is not committed in S is β–last-use legal in S.
Definition 25 (β–Last-use Opacity). A history H is β–last-use opaque if, and only if,
every finite prefix of H is final-state β–last-use opaque.
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In this variant of last use opacity a transaction is not allowed to release a variable early
if it is possible that the transaction may execute a voluntary abort. In effect, βlu opacity
precludes inconsistent views in the programmer initiated abort model.
The βlu opacity property is trivially equivalent to last-use opacity in the only forced
abort model (because there are no tryA operations in that model), but it is stronger than
last-use opacity in the arbitrary abort model to the point of being overstrict.
The βlu opacity property is strictly stronger than last-use opacity in the arbitrary abort
model, but it is too strong to be applicable to systems with early release. In the first place,
even though the histories that are excluded by βlu opacity contain inconsistent views, these
are harmless, because as we argue in Section 4.3, transactions always release variables with
“final” values. These final values cannot be reverted by a programmer-initiated abort, so
if the programmer sets up a closing write to a variable in a transaction, the value that was
written was expected to both remain unchanged and be committed. Hence, it is accept-
able for these values to be read by other transactions, even before the original transaction
commits.
Secondly, the arbitrary abort model specifies that the TM system can inject a tryA
operation into the transactional code to respond to some outside stimuli, such as crashes.
Such events are unpredictable, so it may be possible for any transaction to abort at any
time. Hence, it is necessary to assume that a tryA operation can be produced as the next
operation invocation in any transaction at any time. In effect, as the definition of βlu opacity
does not allow a transaction to release a variable early if a tryA is possible in the future,
βlu opacity actually prevents early release altogether in the arbitrary abort model.
In summary, βlu opacity is a useful variant of last-use opacity to exclude inconsistent
views in the programmer initiated abort model (if workarounds suggested in Section 4.3 are
insufficient solutions). However βlu opacity is too strict for TMs operating in the arbitrary
abort model, where it prevents early release altogether. For that reason, last-use opacity
remains our focus.
5 Supremum Versioning Algorithm
In this section we discuss the Supremum Versioning Algorithm (SVA), a pessimistic con-
currency control algorithm with early release and rollback support, and demonstrate that
it satisfies last-use opacity. SVA in its current form was introduced in [34, 31], although the
presentation here gives a more complete description. It builds on our rollback-free variant in
[40, 38, 39] as well as an earlier version in [30]. Even though the current implementation of
SVA as part of Atomic RMI is distributed, the concurrency control algorithm itself was cre-
ated for multiprocessor TMs and is applicable to both distributed as well as multiprocessor
systems.
The main aspect of SVA is the ability to release variables early. The early release
mechanism in SVA is based on a priori knowledge about the maximum number of accesses
that a transaction can perform on particular variables. We explored various methods of
obtaining satisfactory upper bounds, including static analysis [29] and static typing [38]. A
transaction that knows it performed exactly as many operations on some variable as the
upper bound allows may then release that variable. SVA does not require the upper bounds
to be precise, and can handle situation when they are either too great (some variables are
not released early) or too low (transactions are aborted). Since SVA does not distinguish
between reads and writes when releasing, but instead treats all accesses uniformly, we will
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1 procedure start(Transaction Ti) {
2 for (x : ASetpTiq sorted by ălk)
3 lock lkpxq
4 for (x : ASetpTiq in parallel) {
5 gvpxq Ð gvpxq + 1
6 pvipxq Ð gvpxq
7 }
8 for (x : ASetpTiq sorted by ălk)
9 unlock lkpxq
10 }
12 procedure access(Transaction Ti, Var x) {
13 wait until pvipxq - 1 = lvpxq
14 checkpoint(Ti, x)
15 if (rvipxq ‰ cvpxq)
16 abort(Ti) and exit
17 execute read or write
18 acipxq Ð acipxq + 1
19 if (acipxq = supripxq) {
20 cvpxq Ð pvipxq
21 lvpxq Ð pvipxq
22 }
23 }
25 procedure abort(Transaction Ti) {
26 for (x : ASetpTiq in parallel) {
27 wait until pvipxq - 1 = ltvpxq
28 dismiss(Ti, x)
29 restore(Ti, x)
30 delete stipxq
31 ltvpxq Ð pvipxq
32 }
33 }
34 procedure commit(Transaction Ti) {
35 for (x : ASetpTiq in parallel) {
36 wait until pvipxq - 1 = ltvpxq
37 dismiss(Ti, x)
38 }
39 if (Dx in ASetpTiq such that rvipxq > cvpxq)
40 abort(Ti) and exit
41 for (x : ASetpTiq in parallel) {
42 delete stipxq
43 ltvpxq Ð pvipxq
44 }
45 }
47 procedure checkpoint(Transaction Ti, Var x) {
48 if (acipxq = 0) {
49 copy x to stipxq
50 rvipxq Ð cvpxq
51 }
52 }
54 procedure dismiss(Transaction Ti, Var x) {
55 if (acipxq = 0 and rvipxq = cvpxq)
56 cvpxq Ð pvipxq
57 if (pvipxq - 1 = lvpxq)
58 lvpxq Ð pvipxq
59 }
61 procedure restore(Transaction Ti, Var x) {
62 if (acipxq ‰ 0 and rvipxq < cvpxq) {
63 revert x from stipxq
64 cvpxq Ð rvipxq
65 }
66 }
Figure 23: SVA pseudocode.
extend the definition of closing write and closing read operation executions to a closing
access execution which is such a read or write operation, that is not followed by any other
closing read or closing write operation.
5.1 Counters
The basic premise of versioning algorithms is that counters are associated with transactions
and used to allow or deny access by these transactions to shared objects (rather than only for
recovery). SVA uses several version counters. The private version counter pvipxq uniquely
defines the version of transaction Ti with respect to variable x. The global version counter
gvpxq shows how many transactions that have x in their access set have started. The local
version counter lvpxq shows which transaction can currently and exclusively access variable
x. Specifically, the transaction that can access x is such Ti whose pvipxq is one greater than
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lvpxq (we refer to this as the access condition). The local terminal version counter ltvpxq
shows which of the transactions that have x in their access set can currently commit or
abort. That is, Ti such that x P ASetpTiq can commit or abort if its pvipxq is one greater
than ltvpxq.
In addition, the current version counter cvpxq defines what state the variable is in and
transactions that operate on x will increment its cvpxq to indicate a change of state. It
will also revert the counter to indicate a rollback (abort). A recovery version counter
rvipxq indicates what state variable x was in prior to transaction Ti’s modifications. These
counters are used together to detect whether a variable accessed by the current transaction
was rolled back by some other transaction, requiring that the current transaction roll back
as well. These counters also determine which transaction is responsible for reverting the
state of the variable and to what state it should be reverted. In order be able to revert
the state of variable SVA also uses a variable store st, where transactions store copies of
variables before modifying them.
In order to detect the closing use of a variable, SVA requires that suprema on accesses
be given for each variable used by a transaction. These are given for each variable x in
transaction Ti’s access set as supripxq. If the supremum is unknown supripxq “ 8. We
assume that if a supremum on accessing some variable x is zero, then x is excluded from the
transaction’s access set. Then, access counter acipobjq is used to track the actual number
of accesses by Ti on x and to check when the supremum is reached, to release a variable
early.
Finally, SVA uses a map of locks lk, containing one lock for each variable to make
a globally consistent snapshots. Locks are acquired and released in order ălk to prevent
deadlocks. Initially, all locks are unlocked, counters are set to zero, and the variable store
is empty.
5.2 Transactions
The pseudocode for SVA is shown in Fig. 23. The life cycle of every SVA transaction begins
with procedure start (we also refer to this part as initialization). Following that, a trans-
action may execute one or more accesses (reads or writes) to shared variables (procedure
access). After any access or right after start a transaction may then either proceed to
commit or abort, both of which end a transaction’s life cycle. SVA transactions are pre-
vented from committing until all preceding transactions which released their variables early
and with which the current transaction shares variables also commit. Accesses to shared
variables can be interleaved with various transaction-local operations, including accesses to
non-shared structures or variables. However, those are only visible to the transaction to
which they are local, so they do not influence other transactions. For the purpose of clarity,
but without loss of generality, we omit those operations here. We also assume that transac-
tions are executed in a single, fresh, dedicated thread. We also omit the concepts of nested
and recurrent transactions.
Start The initialization of a transaction is shown in start at line 1. When transaction Ti
starts it uses gvpxq to assign itself a unique version pvipxq for each variable x in its access set
ASetpTiq. This must be done atomically and in isolation, so these operations are guarded
by locks—one lock lkpxq for each variable used.
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Accesses Variables are accessed via procedure access at line 12. Before accessing a
variable, transaction Ti waits for the access condition to be satisfied at line 13 (e.g. for
the preceding transaction to release it). When this happens, Ti makes a backup copy using
checkpoint (line 47). This procedure checks whether this is the first access, and if so makes
a backup copy of x to stipxq at line 49 and sets the recovery counter to the current version
of x at line 50 to indicate which version of x the transaction first viewed and can revert to
in case of rollback (abort). Then, the access (either a write or read) is actually performed.
Afterward, transaction Ti increments the access counter acipxq (line 18) and proceeds
to check whether this was the closing access on x by comparing acipxq to the appropriate
supremum supripxq (line 19). If this is the case, the variable is released early—i.e, lvpxq
is set to the same value as the transaction’s private counter pvipxq (line 21). At this point,
some other transaction Tj , whose pvjpxq ´ 1 “ lvpxq can start accessing the variable using
procedure access. Another provision made in SVA is that when variable x is released by
transaction Ti, cvpxq is set to the transaction’s pvipxq version (during early release at line
20). This signifies both that there is a new consistent version of x and that Ti modified x
the most recently.
Commit Transaction Ti can attempt to commit using procedure commit at line 34. The
variables in the transaction’s access set are committed independently (possibly in parallel).
First, transaction Ti must pass the commit condition at line 36 for each variable in its access
set, so that a transaction is not allowed to commit before all the transactions that accessed
the same variables as Ti before Ti commit or abort. The transaction then checks whether
it has access to the variable and if this is not the case, i.e., the variable was not accessed
at all, waits until the preceding transaction releases it at line 43. Then, the committing
transaction executes procedure dismiss at line 54. At this point, if the transaction did
not access the variable before commit, the current version counter is updated (line 56).
Furthermore, if this transaction has not previously released some variable x, lvpxq is set to
pvipxq to indicate the object is released (line 58). Finally, the transaction erases backup
copies from the store st (line 42) and sets ltvpxq to its private version counter’s value (line
43) to indicate that a subsequent transaction can now perform commit or abort on x.
Abort Aborts are not performed by SVA as part of its basic modus operandi, but aborts
can be triggered manually by the programmer. Furthermore, such manually-triggered aborts
can also cause other transactions to abort. If the programmer decides to abort a transaction,
or if an abort is forced, procedure abort (line 25) is used. As with commit, in on order for
the abort to proceed, the transaction must pass the commit condition at line 27 for each
variable in its access set. Then, previously unreleased variables are released using dismiss
(as described above). Afterward, the transaction restores its variables using procedure
restore (line 61). There, if Ti accessed x at least once and the version of x that it stored
prior to accessing x (rvipxq) is lower than the current version of x (cvpxq), then Ti is
responsible for reverting x to the previous state (condition at line 62). In that case, this
procedure reverts x to a copy from stipxq (line 63). It also sets the current version to rvipxq
(line 64), indicating that variable x was restored to the state just from before Ti modified
it. Note that this means that cvpxq was set to a lower value than before. Finally, the
transaction cleans up stipxq (line 30) and sets ltvpxq to its private version counter’s value
(line 31). As with commit, this procedure may operate on each variable in parallel.
If a manual abort is triggered by the user it may be the case that transaction Ti releases
variable x and aborts after some other transaction Tj already reads the value written to x
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Ti
start i
pvipxqÐ1
ripxq0 wipxq1
lvpxqÐ1
wipyq1 tryC iÑCi
Tj
startj
pvjpxqÐ2
rjpxq
lvpxq“1?
Ñ1 wjpxq2 tryC jÑCj
Figure 24: SVA early release example. The symbol denotes an operation execution
split into the invocation event and the response event to indicate waiting and indicates
what caused the wait.
by Ti. In that case Tj must be forced to abort along with Ti. Hence, if subsequently the
situation arises that some other transaction Tj tries to access x after Ti released it early
and aborted, there is a condition at line 15 in procedure access which will compare the
values of cvpxq and rvipxq for x. If cvpxq and rvjpxq are equal, that implies Tj currently
has access to a consistent state of x and can access it. However, if rvjpxq is greater than
cvpxq, this means that some previous transaction (i.e., Ti) set cvpxq to a lower value than
it was before, which means it aborted and reverted x. This causes Tj to be forced to abort
(line 16) instead of accessing x. As an aside, if cvpxq is greater than rvjpxq, then Tj already
stopped modifying x and released it, so there should not be any more accesses to x. This
means that Tj violated its upper bound for x and must also be forced to abort.
Similarly, if transaction Tj tries to commit after Ti aborted, then it checks the condition
at line 39 for each variable, and if there is at least one variable x for which rvjpxq is greater
than cvpxq, then again some previous Ti must have aborted and reverted x and Tj must
then abort too. Note that aborted transactions revert variables in the order imposed by the
commit condition in wait (line 27), which ensures state consistency after rollback.
5.3 Examples
To illustrate further, the examples in Fig. 24–27 show some scenarios of interacting SVA
transactions. In Fig. 24, transactions Ti and Tj both try to increment variable x. Since Ti
starts before Tj , it has a lower version for x (e.g., pvipxqÐ 1) than Tj (e.g., pvjpxqÐ 2).
So, when accessing x, Ti will pass its access condition for x sooner than Tj . Thus, Tj has
to wait, while Ti executes its operations on x. After its last operation on x, Ti releases
it by setting x’s local counter to its own version (lvpxq Ð 1). From this moment T1 can
no longer access x. But since the local counter is now equal to 1, which is one lower than
Tj ’s version for x of 2, Tj can now pass the access condition for x and start executing
operations. In effect Ti and Tj can execute in parallel in part. Fig. 25 shows a similar
example of a transaction Ti releasing x early and operating on y while a later transaction Tj
operates on x in parallel. The scenario differs from the last in that Tj finishes work before
Ti, however it still waits with committing until Ti commits. Fig. 26 shows another similar
scenario, except Ti eventually aborts. Then, Tj is also forced to abort (and retry) by SVA.
Note that if meanwhile Tj released x early and some transaction Tk accessed it, Tk would
also be aborted. Thus, a cascading abort including multiple transactions is a possibility.
Finally, Fig. 27 shows two transactions operating on different variables. Since SVA performs
synchronization per variable, if the access sets of two transactions do not intersect, they can
both execute in parallel, without any synchronization.
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Ti
start i
pvipxqÐ1
wipxq1 ripyq0 wipyq1 tryC iÑCi
ltvpxqÐ1
Tj
startj
pvjpxqÐ2
rjpxq1 wjpxq2 tryC j
ltvpxq“1?
ÑCj
Figure 25: SVA wait on commit example.
Ti
start i
pvipxqÐ1
wipxq1 ripyq0 wipyq1 tryAiÑAi
ltvpxqÐ1
Tj
startj
pvjpxqÐ2
rjpxq1 wjpxq2 tryC j
ltvpxq“1?
ÑAj
Figure 26: SVA cascading abort example.
5.4 Safety of SVA
We present a proof sketch showing that SVA is last-use opaque. A complete proof is in
Appendix D. First, we make the following straightforward observations about SVA.
Observation 1 (Version Order). Given the set TxH of all transactions that access x in H
there is a total order called a version order ăx on TxH s.t. for any Ti, Tj P TxH , Ti ăx Tj if
pvipxq ă pvjpxq.
Observation 2 (Access Order). If Ti ăx Tj and Ti performs operation opi on x, and Tj
performs operation opj on x, then opi is completed in H before opj.
Observation 3 (No Bufferring). Since transactions operate on variables rather than buffers,
any read operation op “ ripxq Ñ v in any transaction Ti is preceded in H by some write
operation wjpxqv Ñ ok j in some Tj (possibly i “ j).
Observation 4 (Read from Released). If transaction Ti executes a read operation or a
write operation op on x in H, then any transaction that previously executed a read or write
operation on x is either committed, aborted, or decided on x before op.
Observation 5 (Do not Read Aborted). Assuming unique writes, if transaction Ti executes
wipxqv Ñ u and aborts in H, then x will be reverted to a previous value. In consequence,
no other transaction can read v from x.
Ti
start i
pvipxqÐ1
ripxq0
lvpxq“0?
wipxq1 tryC iÑCi
Tj
startj
pvipyqÐ1
rjpyq0
lvpyq“0?
wjpyq1 tryC jÑCj
Figure 27: SVA parallel execution example.
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Observation 6 (Commit Order). If transaction Ti accesses x in H and commits or aborts
in H, any transaction that previously executed a read or write operation on x is either
committed or aborted before Ti commits or aborts.
Observation 7 (Forced Abort). If transaction Ti reads x from Tj and Tj subsequently
aborts, then Ti also aborts.
Then, the main lemma follows, showing that SVA produces final-state opaque histories.
For convenience, we assume that the SVA program always writes values to variables that
are unique and in the domain of the variable.
Lemma 11. Any SVA history H is final-state last-use opaque.
sketch. Let HC “ ComplpHq be a completion of H if for every Ti P H, if Ti is live or commit-
pending in H, then Ti is aborted in HC . Given HC we can construct SˆH , a sequential history
s.t. SˆH ” HC , where for any two transactions Ti, Tj P HC :
a) if Ti ăHC Tj , then Ti ăSˆH Tj ,
b) if Ti ăx Tj for any variable x, then Ti ăSˆH Tj .
Note that if some transaction Ti commits in H, then it commits in SˆH (and vice versa).
Otherwise Ti aborts in SˆH .
Let Ti be any transaction committed in H. Thus, Ti also commits in SˆH . From Ob-
servation 3, any read operation execution opi “ ripxq Ñ v in H|Ti is preceded in H by
opj “ wjpxqv Ñ ok j . If opi is local, then i “ j, so opj is in a committed transaction. If
opi is not local, then i ‰ j. In that case, from Observation 5, Tj cannot be aborted before
opi in H. Consequently, Tj is either committed before opi in H, live in H, or committed or
aborted after opi. In the former case Ti reads from a committed transaction. In the latter
case, since Ti is committed, then from Observation 4 and Observation 6 we know that Tj
commits or aborts in H before Ti commits. In addition, from Observation 7 we know that
Tj cannot abort in H, because it would have caused Ti to also abort. Thus, any committed
Ti reads only from committed transactions.
From Observation 2, if Ti reads from the value written by an operation in Tj then the
write in Tj completes before the read in Ti, which implies Tj ăx Ti. Hence, Tj ăSˆH Ti.
Thus, if Ti is committed in SˆH and reads from some Tj , then any such Tj is committed and
precedes Ti, so SˆH |Tj Ď VispSˆH , Tiq. Since all reads in committed transactions read from
preceding committed transactions, then for each read in VispSˆH , Tiq reading v from x there
will be a write operation execution writing v to x in VispSˆH , Tiq. Since, from Observation 2
all accesses on x operations follow ăx, then VispSˆH , Tiq is legal for any committed Ti. Thus,
any Ti that is committed in SˆH is legal in SˆH .
Let Ti be a transaction that is live or aborts in H, so it aborts in SˆH . From Observation 3
any read operation execution opi “ ripxq Ñ v in H|Ti is preceded in H by opj “ wjpxqv Ñ
ok j . If opi is local, then i “ j, so opj is always in VispSˆH , Tiq where opj precedes opi. If
opi is not local, then i ‰ j. In that case, from Observation 5, Tj cannot be aborted before
opi in H. Consequently, Tj is either committed before opi in H, live in H, or committed or
aborted after opi. In the former case Ti reads from a committed transaction. In the latter
case, from Observation 4 we know that either Tj commits in H or Tj is decided on x in H.
Thus, any committed Ti reads x only from committed transactions or transactions that are
decided on x.
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From Observation 2, if Ti reads from the value written by an operation in Tj then the
write in Tj completes before the read in Ti, which implies Tj ăx Ti. Hence, Tj ăSˆH Ti.
Thus, if Ti is aborted in SˆH and reads from some Tj , then any such Tj is either committed
and precedes Ti, so SˆH |Tj Ď LVispSˆH , Tiq, or Tj is decided on any x if Ti reads from x,
so SˆH
˛|Tj Ď LVispSˆH , Tiq. Since all reads in aborted transactions read x from preceding
committed transactions or transactions decided on x, then for each read in LVispSˆH , Tiq
reading v from x there will be a write operation execution writing v to x. Since, from
Observation 2 all accesses on x operations follow ăx, then LVispSˆH , Tiq is legal for any
aborted Ti. Thus, any Ti that is aborted in SˆH is last-use legal in SˆH .
Since any committed Ti in SˆH is legal in SˆH , and any aborted Ti in SˆH is last-use legal
in SˆH , and since SˆH trivially follows the real time order of H, then from Def. 21 H is
final-state last-use opaque.
Theorem 16. Any SVA history H is last-use opaque.
Proof. Since by Lemma 11 any SVA history H is final-state last-use opaque, and any prefix
P of H is also an SVA history, then every prefix of H is also final-state last-use opaque.
Thus, by Def. 22, H is last-use opaque.
6 Related Work
Ever since opacity [14, 15] was introduced, it seems, there were attempts to weaken its strin-
gent requirements, while retaining some guarantees over what serializability [6, 25] provides.
We explore the most pertinent examples in Section 3: TMS1, TMS2 [11], elastic opacity [13],
live opacity [12], and VWC [21], as well as some apposite consistency criteria: recoverability
[16], ACA [7], strictness [7], and rigorousness [9]. Other attempts were more specialized
and include virtual time opacity [21], where the real-time order condition is relaxed. Simi-
larly, the ˛ opacity family of properties [22] relax the time ordering requirements of opacity
to provide properties applicable to deffered update replication. Another example is view
transactions [1], where it is only required that a transaction commits on any snapshot, that
can be different than the one the transaction viewed initially, provided that operating on
either snapshot produced externally indistinguishable results. While these properties have
specific applications, none weaken the consistency to allow variable access before commit.
Although algorithms and systems are not the focus of this paper, some systems research
that explores relaxed consistency should be noted. We already mention our own SVA [31]
in Section 5. Dynamic STM [19] is another system with early release, and it can be credited
with introducing the concept of early release in the TM context. Dynamic STM allows
transactions that only perform read operations on particular variables to (manually) release
them for use by other transactions. However, it left the assurance of safety to the program-
mer, and, as the authors state, even linearizability cannot be guaranteed by the system. The
authors of [35] expanded on the work above and evaluated the concept of early release with
respect to read-only variables on several concurrent data structures. The results showed
that this form of early release does not provide a significant advantage in most cases, al-
though there are scenarios where it would be advantageous if it were automated. We use a
different approach in SVA, where early release is not limited to read-only variables. Twi-
light STM [8] relaxes isolation to allow transactions to read variables that are used by other
transactions, and allow them to re-read their values as they change in order to maintain
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the correctness of the computation. If inconsistencies arise, a reconciliation is attempted on
commit, and aborts are induced if this is impossible. Since it allows operating on variables
that were released early, but potentially before closing write, Twilight STM will not satisfy
the consistency requirements of last-use opacity, but it is likely to guarantee serializability
and recoverability.
DATM [26] is yet another noteworthy system with an early release mechanism. DATM
is an optimistic multicore-oriented TM based on TL2 [10], augmented with early-release
support. It allows a transaction Ti to write to a variable that was accessed by some un-
committed transaction Tj , as long as Tj commits before Ti. DATM also allows transaction
Ti to read a speculative value, one written by Tj and accessed by Ti before Tj commits.
DATM detects if Tj overwrites the data or aborts, in which case Ti is forced to restart.
DATM allows all schedules alowed by conflict-serializability. This means that DATM allows
overwritting, as well as cascading aborts. It also means that it does not satisfy last-use
opacity.
7 Conclusions
This paper explored the space of TM safety properties in terms of whether or not, and to
what extent, they allow a transaction to release a variable early, or, in other words, for a
transaction to read a value written by a live transaction. We showed that existing properties
are either strong, but prevent early release altogether (opacity, TMS1 and TMS2), or pose
impractical restrictions on the ability of transactions to abort (VWC and live opacity). The
remainder of the properties are not strong enough for TM applications (serializability and
recoverability) since they allow a large range of inconsistent views, including overwriting.
Hence, we presented a new TM safety property called last-use opacity that strikes a reason-
able compromise. It allows early release without a requirement for transactions that release
early not to abort, but one that is nevertheless strong enough to prevent most inconsistent
views and make others inconsequential. The resulting property may be a useful practical
criterion for reasoning about TMs with early release support.
We discussed the histories that are allowed by last-use opacity and examined the guar-
antees the property gives to the programmer. Last-use opacity always allows for potential
inconsistent views to occur due to cascading aborts. However, no other inconsistent views
are allowed. The inconsistent views that can occur can be made harmless by taking away
the programmer’s ability to execute arbitrary aborts by either removing that operation com-
pletely or by removing it from the programmer’s toolkit, but allowing it to be used by the
TM system, e.g. for fault tolerance. Allowing the programmer to abort a transaction at
will means that they will need to eliminate dangerous situations (possible division by zero,
invalid memory accesses, etc.) on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, we predict that incon-
sistent views of this sort will be relatively rare in practical TM applications, and typically
result from using the abort operation to program business logic. Alternatively, a variant
of last-use opacity called β–last-use opacity can be used instead, which eliminates the in-
consistent views by preventing early release in transactions where a programmatic abort is
possible.
Finally, we discussed SVA, a pessimistic concurrency control TM algorithm with early
release, which we show satisfies last-use opacity.
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Ti
start i wipxq1 tryC iÑCi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryC jÑCj
Figure 28: History H1, last-use opaque.
A Last-use Opacity History Examples
By A Ď B we denote that sequence A is a substring of B.
Note the following about Seqpxq for any x, Ti, Tj :
rripxq Ñ 0s P Seqpxq (1)
rwipxq1 Ñ ok is P Seqpxq (2)
rwipxq1 Ñ Ais P Seqpxq (3)
rwipxq1 Ñ ok i, rjpxq Ñ 1s P Seqpxq (4)
rwipxq1 Ñ ok i, rjpxq Ñ Ais P Seqpxq (5)
rwipxq1 Ñ ok i, rjpxq Ñ 1,wjpxq2 Ñ ok js P Seqpxq (6)
rwipxq1 Ñ ok i, rjpxq Ñ 1,wjpxq2 Ñ Ajs P Seqpxq (7)
∅ P Seqpxq (8)
rripxq Ñ 1s R Seqpxq (9)
rwipxq1 Ñ ok i,wipxq2 Ñ ok i, ripxq Ñ 1s R Seqpxq (10)
rwipxq1 Ñ ok i, ripyq Ñ 1, rjpxq Ñ 1,wjpyq1 Ñ ok js R Seqpxq (11)
Lemma 12. H1 is final-state last-use opaque.
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Proof.
let C1 “ ComplpH1q “ H1 (12)
let S1 “ C1|Ti ¨ C1|Tj (13)
S1 ” C1 (14)
real time order ăH1“ ∅ (15)
real time order ăS1“ tTi ăS1 Tju (16)
p15q ^ p16q ùñăS1ĎăH1 (17)
i “ i ùñ S1|Ti Ď VispS1, Tiq (18)
Ti ăS1 Tj ùñ S1|Tj Ę VispS1, Tiq (19)
p18q ^ p19q ùñ VispS1, Tiq “ S1|Ti (20)
p20q ùñ VispS1, Tiq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok is (21)
p21q ^ p2q ùñ VispS1, Tiq is legal (22)
p22q ùñ Ti in S1 is legal in S1 (23)
Ti ăS1 Tj ^ resipCiq P S1|Ti ùñ S1|Ti Ď VispS1, Tiq (24)
j “ j ùñ S1|Tj Ď VispS1, Tiq (25)
p24q ^ p25q ùñ VispS1, Tjq “ S1|Ti ¨ S1|Tj (26)
p26q ùñ VispS1, Tjq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok i, rjpxq Ñ 1s (27)
p27q ^ p4q ùñ VispS1, Tjq is legal (28)
p28q ùñ Tj in S1 is legal in S1 (29)
p14q ^ p17q ^ p23q ^ p29q ùñ H1 is final-state last-use opaque (30)
Let P 11 be a prefix s.t. H1 “ P 11 ¨ rresjpCjqs.
Lemma 13. P 11 is final-state last-use opaque.
Proof.
let C11 “ ComplpP 11 q “ P 11 ¨ rresjpCjqs (31)
H1 “ C11 ^ Lemma 12 ùñ P 11 is final-state last-use opaque (32)
Let P 12 be a prefix s.t. H1 “ P 12 ¨ rtryC j Ñ Cjs.
Lemma 14. P 12 is final-state last-use opaque.
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Proof.
let C12 “ ComplpP 12 q “ P 12 ¨ rtryAj Ñ Ajs (33)
let S12 “ C12 |Ti ¨ C12 |Tj (34)
S12 ” C12 (35)
real time order ăP 12“ ∅ (36)
real time order ăS12“ tTi ăS12 Tju (37)
p36q ^ p37q ùñăS12ĎăP 12 (38)
i “ i ùñ S12 |Ti Ď VispS12 , Tiq (39)
Ti ăS12 Tj ùñ S12 |Tj Ę VispS12 , Tiq (40)
p39q ^ p40q ùñ VispS12 , Tiq “ S12 |Ti (41)
p41q ùñ VispS12 , Tiq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok is (42)
p42q ^ p2q ùñ VispS12 , Tiq is legal (43)
p43q ùñ Ti in S12 is legal in S12 (44)
Ti ăS12 Tj ^ resipCiq P S12 |Ti ùñ S12 |Ti Ď LVispS12 , Tjq (45)
j “ j ùñ S12 |Tj Ď LVispS12 , Tjq (46)
p45q ^ p46q ùñ LVispS12 , Tjq “ S12 |Ti ¨ S12 |Tj (47)
p47q ùñ LVispS12 , Tjq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok i, rjpxq Ñ 1s (48)
p48q ^ p4q ùñ LVispS12 , Tjq is legal (49)
p49q ùñ Tj in S12 is last-use legal in S12 (50)
p35q ^ p38q ^ p44q ^ p50q ùñ P 12 is final-state last-use opaque (51)
Let P 13 be a prefix s.t. H1 “ P 13 ¨ rresipCiq, tryC j Ñ Cjs.
Lemma 15. P 13 is final-state last-use opaque.
Proof.
let C13 “ ComplpP 13 q “ P 13 ¨ rresipCiq, tryC j Ñ Cjs (52)
P 12 “ C13 ^ Lemma 14 ùñ P 13 is final-state last-use opaque (53)
Let P 14 be a prefix s.t. H1 “ P 14 ¨ rtryC i Ñ Ci, tryC j Ñ Cjs.
Lemma 16. P 14 is final-state last-use opaque.
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Proof.
let C14 “ ComplpP 14 q “ P 14 ¨ rtryAi Ñ Ai, tryAj Ñ Ajs (54)
let S14 “ C14 |Ti ¨ C14 |Tj (55)
S14 ” C14 (56)
real time order ăP 14“ ∅ (57)
real time order ăS14“ tTi ăS14 Tju (58)
p57q ^ p58q ùñăS14ĎăP 14 (59)
i “ i ùñ S14 |Ti Ď LVispS14 , Tiq (60)
Ti ăS14 Tj ùñ S14 |Tj Ę LVispS14 , Tiq (61)
p60q ^ p61q ùñ LVispS14 , Tiq “ S14 |Ti (62)
p62q ùñ VispS14 , Tiq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok is (63)
p63q ^ p2q ùñ LVispS14 , Tiq is legal (64)
p64q ùñ Ti in S14 is last-use legal in S14 (65)
wipxq1 Ñ ok i is closing write on x in Ti ùñ Ti is decided on xS14 (66)
Ti ăS14 Tj ^ p66q ùñ S14
˛|Ti Ď LVispS14 , Tjq (67)
j “ j ùñ S14 |Tj Ď LVispS14 , Tjq (68)
p67q ^ p68q ùñ LVispS14 , Tjq “ S14
˛|Ti ¨ S14 |Tj (69)
p69q ùñ LVispS14 , Tjq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok i, rjpxq Ñ 1s (70)
p70q ^ p4q ùñ LVispS14 , Tjq is legal (71)
p71q ùñ Tj in S14 is last-use legal in S14 (72)
p56q ^ p59q ^ p65q ^ p72q ùñ P 14 is final-state last-use opaque (73)
Let P 15 be a prefix s.t. H1 “ P 15 ¨ rresip1q, tryC i Ñ Ci, tryC j Ñ Cjs.
Lemma 17. P 15 is final-state last-use opaque.
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Proof.
let C15 “ ComplpP 15 q “ P 15 ¨ rresAii p, qtryAj Ñ Ajs (74)
let S15 “ C15 |Ti ¨ C15 |Tj (75)
S15 ” C15 (76)
real time order ăP 15“ ∅ (77)
real time order ăS15“ tTi ăS15 Tju (78)
p77q ^ p78q ùñăS15ĎăP 15 (79)
i “ i ùñ S15 |Ti Ď LVispS15 , Tiq (80)
Ti ăS15 Tj ùñ S15 |Tj Ę LVispS15 , Tiq (81)
p80q ^ p81q ùñ LVispS15 , Tiq “ S15 |Ti (82)
p82q ùñ VispS15 , Tiq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok is (83)
p83q ^ p2q ùñ LVispS15 , Tiq is legal (84)
p84q ùñ Ti in S15 is last-use legal in S15 (85)
wipxq1 Ñ ok i is closing write on x in Ti ùñ Ti is decided on x (86)
Ti ăS15 Tj ^ p86q ùñ S15
˛|Ti Ď LVispS15 , Tjq (87)
j “ j ùñ S15 |Tj Ď LVispS15 , Tjq (88)
p87q ^ p88q ùñ LVispS15 , Tjq “ S15
˛|Ti ¨ S15 |Tj (89)
p89q ùñ LVispS15 , Tjq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok i, rjpxq Ñ Ais (90)
p90q ^ p5q ùñ LVispS15 , Tjq is legal (91)
p91q ùñ Tj in S15 is last-use legal in S15 (92)
p76q ^ p79q ^ p85q ^ p92q ùñ P 15 is final-state last-use opaque (93)
Let P 16 be a prefix s.t. H1 “ P 16 ¨ rr1pxq Ñ 1, tryC i Ñ Ci, tryC j Ñ Cjs.
Lemma 18. P 16 is final-state last-use opaque.
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Proof.
let C16 “ ComplpP 16 q “ P 16 ¨ rtryAi Ñ Ai, tryAj Ñ Ajs (94)
let S16 “ C16 |Ti ¨ C16 |Tj (95)
S16 ” C16 (96)
real time order ăP 16“ ∅ (97)
real time order ăS16“ tTi ăS16 Tju (98)
p97q ^ p98q ùñăS16ĎăP 16 (99)
i “ i ùñ S16 |Ti Ď LVispS16 , Tiq (100)
Ti ăS16 Tj ùñ S16 |Tj Ę LVispS16 , Tiq (101)
p100q ^ p101q ùñ LVispS16 , Tiq “ S16 |Ti (102)
p102q ùñ VispS16 , Tiq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok is (103)
p103q ^ p2q ùñ LVispS16 , Tiq is legal (104)
p104q ùñ Ti in S16 is last-use legal in S16 (105)
wipxq1 Ñ ok i is closing write on x in Ti ùñ Ti is decided on x (106)
Ti ăS16 Tj ^ p106q ùñ S16
˛|Ti Ď LVispS16 , Tjq (107)
j “ j ùñ S16 |Tj Ď LVispS16 , Tjq (108)
p107q ^ p108q ùñ LVispS16 , Tjq “ S16
˛|Ti ¨ S16 |Tj (109)
p109q ùñ LVispS16 , Tjq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok is (110)
p110q ^ p2q ùñ LVispS16 , Tjq is legal (111)
p111q ùñ Tj in S16 is last-use legal in S16 (112)
p96q ^ p99q ^ p105q ^ p112q ùñ P 16 is final-state last-use opaque (113)
Let P 17 be a prefix s.t. H1 “ P 17 ¨ rresipok iq, rjpxq Ñ 1, tryC i Ñ Ci, tryC j Ñ Cjs.
Lemma 19. P 17 is final-state last-use opaque.
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Proof.
let C17 “ ComplpP 17 q “ P 17 ¨ rresipAiq, tryAj Ñ Ajs (114)
let S17 “ C17 |Ti ¨ C17 |Tj (115)
S17 ” C17 (116)
real time order ăP 17“ ∅ (117)
real time order ăS17“ tTi ăS17 Tju (118)
p117q ^ p118q ùñăS17ĎăP 17 (119)
i “ i ùñ S17 |Ti Ď LVispS17 , Tiq (120)
Ti ăS17 Tj ùñ S17 |Tj Ę LVispS17 , Tiq (121)
p120q ^ p121q ùñ LVispS17 , Tiq “ S17 |Ti (122)
p122q ùñ VispS17 , Tiq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ Ais (123)
p123q ^ p2q ùñ LVispS17 , Tiq is legal (124)
p124q ùñ Ti in S17 is last-use legal in S17 (125)
wipxq1 Ñ Ai is not closing write on x in Ti (126)
S17 |Tj |xztwipxq1 Ñ Aiu “ ∅ (127)
resipCiq R S17 |Ti ^ p127q ùñ S17
˛|Ti Ę LVispS17 , Tjq (128)
j “ j ùñ S17 |Tj Ď LVispS17 , Tjq (129)
p128q ^ p129q ùñ LVispS17 , Tjq “ S17 |Tj (130)
p130q ùñ LVispS17 , Tjq|x “ rs (131)
p131q ^ p8q ùñ LVispS17 , Tjq is legal (132)
p132q ùñ Tj in S17 is last-use legal in S17 (133)
p116q ^ p119q ^ p125q ^ p133q ùñ P 17 is final-state last-use opaque (134)
Let P 1p be a any prefix s.t. H1 “ P 1p ¨R ¨ rwipxq1 Ñ oki, rjpxq Ñ 1, tryC i Ñ Ci, tryC j Ñ
Cjs.
Lemma 20. Any P 1p is final-state last-use opaque.
Proof. Since P 1p does not contain any reads or writes, for any sequential history S ” P 1p ,
transactions Ti and Tj are trivially both legal and last-use legal in S. Thus, P
1
p is final-state
last-use opaque.
Lemma 21. H1 is last-use opaque.
Proof. Since, from Lemmas 35–20, all prefixes of H1 are final-state last-use opaque, then by
Def. 22 H1 is last-use opaque.
Corollary 8. Any prefix of H1 is last-use opaque.
Lemma 22. H2 is final-state last-use opaque.
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Ti
start i wipxq1 tryC iÑCi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryC jÑCj
Figure 29: History H2, not last-use opaque.
Proof.
let C2 “ ComplpH2q “ H2 (135)
let S2 “ C1|Ti ¨ C2|Tj (136)
S2 ” C2 (137)
S2 “ S1 ^ Lemma 12 ùñ H2 is final-state last-use opaque (138)
Let P 21 be a prefix s.t. H2 “ P 21 ¨ rresipCiqs.
Lemma 23. P 21 is final-state last-use opaque.
Proof.
let C21 “ ComplpP 21 q “ P 21 ¨ rresjpCjqs (139)
H2 “ C21 ^ Lemma 22 ùñ P 21 is final-state last-use opaque (140)
Let P 22 be a prefix s.t. H2 “ P 22 ¨ rtryC i Ñ Cis.
Lemma 24. P 22 is not final-state last-use opaque.
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Proof.
let C22 “ ComplpP 22 q “ P 22 ¨ rtryAj Ñ Ajs (141)
let S22 “ C22 |Ti ¨ C22 |Tj (142)
S22 ” C22 (143)
real time order ăP 22“ ∅ (144)
real time order ăS22“ tTi ăS22 Tju (145)
p144q ^ p145q ùñăS22ĎăP 22 (146)
resipAiq P S22 |Ti ùñ S22 |Ti Ę LVispS22 , Tjq (147)
j “ j ùñ S22 |Tj Ď LVispS22 , Tjq (148)
p147q ^ p148q ùñ LVispS22 , Tjq “ S22 |Tj (149)
p149q ùñ LVispS22 , Tjq|x “ rrjpxq Ñ 1s (150)
p150q ^ p9q ùñ LVispS22 , Tjq is not legal (151)
p151q ùñ Tj in S22 is not legal in S22 (152)
let 9S22 “ C22 |Tj ¨ C22 |Ti (153)
9S22 ” C22 (154)
real time order ăP 22“ ∅ (155)
real time order ă 9S22“ tTi ă 9S22 Tju (156)
p155q ^ p156q ùñă 9S22ĎăP 22 (157)
Tj ă 9S22 Ti ùñ 9S
2
2 |Ti Ę Visp 9S22 , Tjq (158)
j “ j ùñ 9S22 |Tj Ď Visp 9S22 , Tiq (159)
p158q ^ p159q ùñ Visp 9S22 , Tjq “ 9S22 |Tj (160)
p160q ùñ Visp 9S22 , Tjq|x “ rrjpxq Ñ 1s (161)
p161q ^ p9q ùñ LVisp 9S22 , Tjq is not legal (162)
p162q ùñ Tj in 9S22 is not legal in 9S22 (163)
p152q ^ p163q ùñ P 22 is not final-state last-use opaque (164)
Lemma 25. H2 is not last-use opaque.
Proof. Even though, from Lemma 22, H2 is final-state last-use opaque, from Lemma 24,
prefix P 22 of H2 is not final-state last-use opaque, so, from Def. 22 H2 is not last-use opaque.
Lemma 26. H3 is final-state last-use opaque.
54
Ti
start i wipxq1 tryAiÑAi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryC jÑAj
Figure 30: History H3, last-use opaque.
Proof.
let C3 “ ComplpH3q “ H3 (165)
let S3 “ C3|Ti ¨ C3|Tj (166)
S3 ” C3 (167)
real time order ăH3“ ∅ (168)
real time order ăS3“ tTi ăS3 Tju (169)
p168q ^ p169q ùñăS3ĎăH3 (170)
i “ i ùñ S3|Ti Ď LVispS3, Tiq (171)
Ti ăS3 Tj ùñ S3|Tj Ę LVispS3, Tiq (172)
p171q ^ p172q ùñ LVispS3, Tiq “ S3|Ti (173)
p173q ùñ VispS3, Tiq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok is (174)
p174q ^ p2q ùñ LVispS3, Tiq is legal (175)
p175q ùñ Ti in S3 is last-use legal in S3 (176)
wipxq1 Ñ ok i is closing write on x in Ti ùñ Ti is decided on xS3 (177)
Ti ăS3 Tj ^ p177q ùñ S3
˛|Ti Ď LVispS3, Tjq (178)
j “ j ùñ S3|Tj Ď LVispS3, Tjq (179)
p178q ^ p179q ùñ LVispS3, Tjq “ S3
˛|Ti ¨ S3|Tj (180)
p180q ùñ LVispS3, Tjq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok i, rjpxq Ñ 1s (181)
p181q ^ p4q ùñ LVispS3, Tjq is legal (182)
p182q ùñ Tj in S3 is last-use legal in S3 (183)
p167q ^ p170q ^ p176q ^ p183q ùñ H3 is final-state last-use opaque (184)
Let P 31 be a prefix s.t. H3 “ P 31 ¨ rresjpAjqs.
Lemma 27. P 31 is final-state last-use opaque.
Proof.
let C31 “ ComplpP 31 q “ P 31 ¨ rresjpAjqs (185)
H3 “ C31 ^ Lemma 26 ùñ P 31 is final-state last-use opaque (186)
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Let P 32 be a prefix s.t. H3 “ P 32 ¨ rtryC j Ñ Ajs.
Lemma 28. P 32 is final-state last-use opaque.
Proof.
let C32 “ ComplpP 32 q “ P 32 ¨ rtryAj Ñ Ajs (187)
let S32 “ C32 |Ti ¨ C32 |Tj (188)
S32 ” C32 (189)
real time order ăP 32“ ∅ (190)
real time order ăS32“ tTi ăS32 Tju (191)
p190q ^ p191q ùñăS32ĎăP 32 (192)
i “ i ùñ S32 |Ti Ď LVispS32 , Tiq (193)
Ti ăS32 Tj ùñ S32 |Tj Ę LVispS32 , Tiq (194)
p193q ^ p194q ùñ LVispS32 , Tiq “ S32 |Ti (195)
p195q ùñ VispS32 , Tiq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok is (196)
p196q ^ p2q ùñ LVispS32 , Tiq is legal (197)
p197q ùñ Ti in S32 is last-use legal in S32 (198)
wipxq1 Ñ ok i is closing write on x in Ti ùñ Ti is decided on xS32 (199)
Ti ăS32 Tj ^ p199q ùñ S32
˛|Ti Ď LVispS32 , Tjq (200)
j “ j ùñ S32 |Tj Ď LVispS32 , Tjq (201)
p200q ^ p201q ùñ LVispS32 , Tjq “ S32
˛|Ti ¨ S32 |Tj (202)
p202q ùñ LVispS32 , Tjq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok i, rjpxq Ñ 1s (203)
p203q ^ p4q ùñ LVispS32 , Tjq is legal (204)
p204q ùñ Tj in S32 is last-use legal in S32 (205)
p189q ^ p192q ^ p198q ^ p205q ùñ P 32 is final-state last-use opaque (206)
Let P 33 be a prefix s.t. H3 “ P 33 ¨ rtryC j Ñ Ajs.
Lemma 29. P 33 is final-state last-use opaque.
Proof.
P 33 “ P 14 ^ Lemma 16 ùñ P 33 is final-state last-use opaque (207)
Let P 3p be a any prefix s.t. P
3
3 .
Lemma 30. Any P 3p is final-state last-use opaque.
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Ti
start i wipxq1 tryAiÑAi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryC jÑCj
Figure 31: History H4, not last-use opaque.
Proof.
H1 “ P 14 ¨R^ Corollary 9 ùñ P 14 is last-use plague (208)
P 14 “ P 33 ^ p208q ùñ P 33 is last-use lopaque (209)
p209q ùñ P 33 is final-state last-use lopaque (210)
Lemma 31. H3 is last-use opaque.
Proof. Since, from Lemmas 27–30, all prefixes of H3 are final-state last-use opaque, then by
Def. 22 H3 is last-use opaque.
Corollary 9. Any prefix of H3 is last-use opaque.
Lemma 32. H4 is not final-state last-use opaque.
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Proof.
let C4 “ ComplpH4q “ H4 (211)
let S4 “ C4|Ti ¨ C4|Tj (212)
S4 ” C4 (213)
real time order ăP4“ ∅ (214)
real time order ăS4“ tTi ăS4 Tju (215)
p214q ^ p215q ùñăS4ĎăP4 (216)
resipAiq P S4|Ti ùñ S4|Ti Ę VispS4, Tjq (217)
j “ j ùñ S4|Tj Ď VispS4, Tjq (218)
p217q ^ p218q ùñ VispS4, Tjq “ S4|Tj (219)
p219q ùñ VispS4, Tjq|x “ rrjpxq Ñ 1s (220)
p220q ^ p9q ùñ VispS4, Tjq is not legal (221)
p221q ùñ Tj in S4 is not legal in S4 (222)
let 9S4 “ C4|Tj ¨ C4|Ti (223)
9S4 ” C4 (224)
real time order ăP4“ ∅ (225)
real time order ă 9S4“ tTi ă 9S4 Tju (226)
p225q ^ p226q ùñă 9S4ĎăP4 (227)
Tj ă 9S4 Ti ùñ 9S4|Ti Ę Visp 9S4, Tjq (228)
j “ j ùñ 9S4|Tj Ď Visp 9S4, Tiq (229)
p228q ^ p229q ùñ Visp 9S4, Tjq “ 9S4|Tj (230)
p230q ùñ Visp 9S4, Tjq|x “ rrjpxq Ñ 1s (231)
p231q ^ p9q ùñ Visp 9S4, Tjq is not legal (232)
p232q ùñ Tj in 9S4 is not legal in 9S4 (233)
p222q ^ p233q ùñ P4 is not final-state last-use opaque (234)
Lemma 33. H4 is not last-use opaque.
Proof. From Lemma 32 is not final-state last-use opaque, then so, from Def. 22 H4 is not
last-use opaque.
Lemma 34. H5 is final-state last-use opaque.
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Ti
start i wipxq1 tryC iÑCi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryC jÑCj
Figure 32: History H5, not last-use opaque. Note that write in Ti is not closing write.
Proof.
let C5 “ ComplpH5q “ H5 (235)
let S5 “ C5|Ti ¨ C5|Tj (236)
S5 ” C5 (237)
real time order ăH5“ ∅ (238)
real time order ăS5“ tTi ăS5 Tju (239)
p238q ^ p239q ùñăS5ĎăH5 (240)
S5 “ S1^p237q^p240q^p23q^p29q ùñ H5 is final-state last-use opaque (241)
Let P 51 be a prefix s.t. H5 “ P 51 ¨ rresjpCjqs.
Lemma 35. P 51 is final-state last-use opaque.
Proof.
let C51 “ ComplpP 51 q “ P 51 ¨ rresjpCjqs (242)
H5 “ C51 ^ Lemma 12 ùñ P 51 is final-state last-use opaque (243)
Let P 52 be a prefix s.t. H5 “ P 52 ¨ rtryC j Ñ Cjs.
Lemma 36. P 52 is final-state last-use opaque.
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Proof.
let C52 “ ComplpP 52 q “ P 52 ¨ rtryAj Ñ Ajs (244)
let S52 “ C52 |Ti ¨ C52 |Tj (245)
S52 ” C52 (246)
real time order ăP 52“ ∅ (247)
real time order ăS52“ tTi ăS52 Tju (248)
p247q ^ p248q ùñăS52ĎăP 52 (249)
i “ i ùñ S52 |Ti Ď VispS52 , Tiq (250)
Ti ăS52 Tj ùñ S52 |Tj Ę VispS52 , Tiq (251)
p250q ^ p251q ùñ VispS52 , Tiq “ S52 |Ti (252)
p252q ùñ VispS52 , Tiq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok is (253)
p253q ^ p2q ùñ VispS52 , Tiq is legal (254)
p254q ùñ Ti in S52 is legal in S52 (255)
Ti ăS52 Tj ^ resipCiq P S52 |Ti ùñ S52 |Ti Ď LVispS52 , Tjq (256)
j “ j ùñ S52 |Tj Ď LVispS52 , Tjq (257)
p256q ^ p257q ùñ LVispS52 , Tjq “ S52 |Ti ¨ S52 |Tj (258)
p258q ùñ LVispS52 , Tjq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok i, rjpxq Ñ 1s (259)
p259q ^ p4q ùñ LVispS52 , Tjq is legal (260)
p260q ùñ Tj in S52 is last-use legal in S52 (261)
p246q ^ p249q ^ p255q ^ p261q ùñ P 52 is final-state last-use opaque (262)
Let P 53 be a prefix s.t. H5 “ P 53 ¨ rresipCiq, tryC j Ñ Cjs.
Lemma 37. P 53 is final-state last-use opaque.
Proof.
let C53 “ ComplpP 53 q “ P 53 ¨ rresipCiq, tryC j Ñ Cjs (263)
P 52 “ C53 ^ Lemma 37 ùñ P 53 is final-state last-use opaque (264)
Let P 54 be a prefix s.t. H5 “ P 15 ¨ rtryC i Ñ Ci, tryC j Ñ Cjs.
Lemma 38. P 54 is not final-state last-use opaque.
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Proof.
let C54 “ ComplpP 54 q “ P 54 ¨ rtryAi Ñ Ai, tryAj Ñ Ajs (265)
let S54 “ C54 |Ti ¨ C54 |Tj (266)
S54 ” C54 (267)
real time order ăP 54“ ∅ (268)
real time order ăS54“ tTi ăS54 Tju (269)
p268q ^ p269q ùñăS54ĎăP 54 (270)
wipxq1 Ñ ok i is not closing write on x in Ti ùñ Ti is not decided on x (271)
Ti ăS54 Tj ^ p271q ùñ S54
˛|Ti Ę LVispS54 , Tjq (272)
j “ j ùñ S54 |Tj Ď LVispS54 , Tjq (273)
p272q ^ p273q ùñ LVispS54 , Tjq “ S54
˛|Ti ¨ S54 |Tj (274)
p274q ùñ LVispS54 , Tjq|x “ rrjpxq Ñ 1s (275)
p275q ^ p4q ùñ LVispS54 , Tjq is not legal (276)
p276q ùñ Tj in S54 is not last-use legal in S54 (277)
let 9S54 “ C54 |Tj ¨ C54 |Ti (278)
9S54 ” C54 (279)
real time order ăP 54“ ∅ (280)
real time order ă 9S54“ tTi ă 9S54 Tju (281)
p280q ^ p281q ùñă 9S54ĎăP 54 (282)
Tj ă 9S54 Ti ùñ 9S
5
4 |Ti Ę LVisp 9S54 , Tjq (283)
j “ j ùñ 9S54 |Tj Ď LVisp 9S54 , Tiq (284)
p283q ^ p284q ùñ LVisp 9S54 , Tjq “ 9S54 |Tj (285)
p285q ùñ LVisp 9S54 , Tjq|x “ rrjpxq Ñ 1s (286)
p286q ^ p9q ùñ LVisp 9S54 , Tjq is not legal (287)
p287q ùñ Tj in 9S54 is not legal in 9S54 (288)
p277q ^ p288q ùñ P 22 is not final-state last-use opaque (289)
Lemma 39. H5 is not last-use opaque.
Proof. Even though, from Lemma 34, H5 is final-state last-use opaque, from Lemma 38,
prefix P 54 of H5 is not final-state last-use opaque, so, from Def. 22 H5 is not last-use opaque.
Lemma 40. H6 is not final-state last-use opaque.
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Ti
start i wipxq1 wipxq2 tryC iÑCi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryAjÑAj
Figure 33: History H6, not last-use opaque.
Proof.
let C6 “ ComplpH6q “ H6 (290)
let S6 “ C6|Ti ¨ C6|Tj (291)
S6 ” C6 (292)
real time order ăH6“ ∅ (293)
real time order ăS6“ tTi ăS6 Tju (294)
p293q ^ p294q ùñăS6ĎăH6 (295)
Ti ăS6 Tj ^ resipCiq P S6|Ti ùñ S6|Ti Ď LVispS6, Tiq (296)
j “ j ùñ S6|Tj Ď LVispS6, Tiq (297)
p296q ^ p297q ùñ VispS6, Tjq “ S6|Ti ¨ S6|Tj (298)
p298q ùñ VispS6, Tjq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok i,wipxq2 Ñ ok i, rjpxq Ñ 1s (299)
p299q ^ p10q ùñ VispS6, Tjq is not legal (300)
p300q ùñ Tj in S6 is not legal in S6 (301)
let 9S6 “ C6|Tj ¨ C6|Ti (302)
9S6 ” C6 (303)
real time order ăH6“ ∅ (304)
real time order ă 9S6“ tTi ă 9S6 Tju (305)
p304q ^ p305q ùñă 9S6ĎăH6 (306)
Tj ă 9S6 Ti ùñ 9S6|Ti Ę LVisp 9S6, Tjq (307)
j “ j ùñ 9S6|Tj Ď LVisp 9S6, Tiq (308)
p307q ^ p308q ùñ LVisp 9S6, Tjq “ 9S6|Tj (309)
p309q ùñ LVisp 9S6, Tjq|x “ rrjpxq Ñ 1s (310)
p310q ^ p9q ùñ LVisp 9S6, Tjq is not legal (311)
p311q ùñ Tj in 9S6 is not legal in 9S6 (312)
p301q ^ p312q ùñ H6 is not final-state last-use opaque (313)
Lemma 41. H6 is not last-use opaque.
Proof. From Lemma 40 is not final-state last-use opaque, then so, from Def. 22 H6 is not
last-use opaque.
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Ti
start i wipxq1 tryC iÑCi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 tryAjÑAj
Figure 34: History H7, last-use opaque.
Lemma 42. H7 is final-state last-use opaque.
Proof.
let C7 “ ComplpH7q “ H7 (314)
let S7 “ C7|Ti ¨ C7|Tj (315)
S7 ” C7 (316)
real time order ăH7“ ∅ (317)
real time order ăS7“ tTi ăS7 Tju (318)
p317q ^ p318q ùñăS7ĎăH7 (319)
i “ i ùñ S7|Ti Ď VispS7, Tiq (320)
Ti ăS7 Tj ùñ S7|Tj Ę VispS7, Tiq (321)
p320q ^ p321q ùñ VispS7, Tiq “ S7|Ti (322)
p322q ùñ VispS7, Tiq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok is (323)
p323q ^ p2q ùñ LVispS7, Tiq is legal (324)
p324q ùñ Ti in S7 is last-use legal in S7 (325)
Ti ăS7 Tj ^ resipCiq P S7|Ti ùñ S7|Ti Ď VispS7, Tiq (326)
j “ j ùñ S7|Tj Ď VispS7, Tjq (327)
p326q ^ p327q ùñ VispS7, Tjq “ S7|Ti ¨ S7|Tj (328)
p328q ùñ LVispS7, Tjq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok i, rjpxq Ñ 1s (329)
p329q ^ p4q ùñ LVispS7, Tjq is legal (330)
p330q ùñ Tj in S7 is last-use legal in S7 (331)
p316q ^ p319q ^ p325q ^ p331q ùñ H7 is final-state last-use opaque (332)
Let P 71 be a prefix s.t. H7 “ P 71 ¨ rresipCiqs.
Lemma 43. P 71 is final-state last-use opaque.
Proof.
let C71 “ ComplpP 71 q “ P 71 ¨ rresipCiqs (333)
H7 “ C71 ^ Lemma 42 ùñ P 71 is final-state last-use opaque (334)
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Let P 72 be a prefix s.t. H7 “ P 72 ¨ rtryC i Ñ Cis.
Proof.
let C72 “ ComplpP 72 q “ P 72 ¨ rtryAi Ñ Ais (335)
let S72 “ C72 |Ti ¨ C72 |Tj (336)
S72 ” C72 (337)
real time order ăP 72“ ∅ (338)
real time order ăS72“ tTi ăS72 Tju (339)
p338q ^ p339q ùñăS72ĎăP 72 (340)
i “ i ùñ S72 |Ti Ď LVispS72 , Tiq (341)
Ti ăS72 Tj ùñ S72 |Tj Ę LVispS72 , Tiq (342)
p341q ^ p342q ùñ LVispS72 , Tiq “ S72 |Ti (343)
p343q ùñ VispS72 , Tiq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok is (344)
p344q ^ p2q ùñ LVispS72 , Tiq is legal (345)
p345q ùñ Ti in S72 is last-use legal in S72 (346)
wipxq1 Ñ ok i is closing write on x in Ti ùñ Ti is decided on x (347)
Ti ăS72 Tj ^ p347q ùñ S72
˛|Ti Ď LVispS72 , Tjq (348)
j “ j ùñ S72 |Tj Ď LVispS72 , Tjq (349)
p348q ^ p349q ùñ LVispS72 , Tjq “ S72
˛|Ti ¨ S72 |Tj (350)
p350q ùñ LVispS72 , Tjq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok is (351)
p351q ^ p2q ùñ LVispS72 , Tjq is legal (352)
p352q ùñ Tj in S72 is last-use legal in S72 (353)
p337q ^ p340q ^ p346q ^ p353q ùñ P 72 is final-state last-use opaque (354)
Lemma 44. P 73 is final-state last-use opaque.
Proof.
let C73 “ ComplpP 73 q “ P 73 ¨ rresjpAjq, tryC i Ñ Cis (355)
P 73 “ C73 ^ Lemma 44 ùñ P 73 is final-state last-use opaque (356)
Let P 74 be a prefix s.t. H3 “ P 74 ¨ rtryC j Ñ Aj , tryC i Ñ Cis.
Lemma 45. P 74 is final-state last-use opaque.
Proof.
P 74 “ P 54 ^ Lemma 38 ùñ P 74 is final-state last-use opaque (357)
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Ti
start i wipxq1 ripyq1
Tj
startj rjpxq1 wjpyq1
Figure 35: History H8, not last-use opaque.
Let P 7p be a any prefix of P
7
4 .
Lemma 46. Any P 7p is final-state last-use opaque.
Proof.
H1 “ P 14 ¨R^ Corollary 8 ùñ P 14 is last-use lopaque (358)
P 14 “ P 74 ^ p358q ùñ P 74 is last-use lopaque (359)
p359q ùñ P 7p is final-state last-use lopaque (360)
Lemma 47. H7 is last-use opaque.
Proof. Since, from Lemmas 43–46, all prefixes of H7 are final-state last-use opaque, then by
Def. 22 H7 is last-use opaque.
Lemma 48. H8 is not final-state last-use opaque.
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Proof.
let C8 “ ComplpH8q “ H8 (361)
let S8 “ C8|Ti ¨ C8|Tj (362)
S8 ” C8 (363)
real time order ăH8“ ∅ (364)
real time order ăS8“ tTi ăS8 Tju (365)
p364q ^ p365q ùñăS8ĎăH8 (366)
Ti ăS8 Tj ^ resipCiq P S8|Ti ùñ S8|Ti Ď LVispS8, Tiq (367)
j “ j ùñ S8|Tj Ď LVispS8, Tiq (368)
p367q ^ p368q ùñ VispS8, Tjq “ S8|Ti ¨ S8|Tj (369)
p369q ùñ VispS8, Tjq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok i, ripyq Ñ 1, rjpxq Ñ 1,wjpyq1 Ñ ok js (370)
p370q ^ p11q ùñ VispS8, Tjq is not legal (371)
p371q ùñ Tj in S8 is not legal in S8 (372)
let 9S8 “ C8|Tj ¨ C8|Ti (373)
9S8 ” C8 (374)
real time order ăH8“ ∅ (375)
real time order ă 9S8“ tTi ă 9S8 Tju (376)
p375q ^ p376q ùñă 9S8ĎăH8 (377)
Tj ă 9S8 Ti ùñ 9S8|Ti Ę LVisp 9S8, Tjq (378)
j “ j ùñ 9S8|Tj Ď LVisp 9S8, Tiq (379)
p378q ^ p379q ùñ LVisp 9S8, Tjq “ 9S8|Tj (380)
p380q ùñ LVisp 9S8, Tjq|x “ rwjpyq1 Ñ ok i, rjpxq Ñ 1, ripyq Ñ 1,wipxq1 Ñ ok is (381)
p381q ^ p11q ùñ LVisp 9S8, Tjq is not legal (382)
p382q ùñ Tj in 9S8 is not legal in 9S8 (383)
p372q ^ p383q ùñ H8 is not final-state last-use opaque (384)
Lemma 49. H8 is not last-use opaque.
Proof. From Lemma 48 is not final-state last-use opaque, then so, from Def. 22 H8 is not
last-use opaque.
Lemma 50. H9 is final-state last-use opaque.
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start i wipxq1 tryAiÑAi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 wjpxq2
Tk
startk rkpxq0
Figure 36: H9, last-use opaque.
Proof.
let C9 “ ComplpH9q “ H9 ¨ rtryAj Ñ Aj , tryAk Ñ Aks (385)
let S9 “ C9|Ti ¨ C9|Tj ¨ C9|Tk (386)
S9 ” C9 (387)
real time order ăH9“ tTi ăH9 Tku (388)
real time order ăS9“ tTi ăS9 Tj , Ti ăS9 Tk, Tj ăS9 Tku (389)
p388q ^ p389q ùñăS9ĎăH9 (390)
i “ i ùñ S9|Ti Ď LVispS9, Tiq (391)
Ti ăS9 Tj ùñ S9|Tj Ę LVispS9, Tiq (392)
Ti ăS9 Tk ùñ S9|Tk Ę LVispS9, Tiq (393)
p391q ^ p392q ^ p393q ùñ LVispS9, Tiq “ S9|Ti (394)
p394q ùñ LVispS9, Tiq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok is (395)
p395q ^ p2q ùñ LVispS9, Tiq is legal (396)
p396q ùñ Ti in S9 is last-use legal in S9 (397)
wipxq1 Ñ ok i is closing write on x in Ti ùñ Ti is decided on x in S9 (398)
Ti ăS9 Tj ^ p398q ùñ S9
˛|Ti Ď LVispS9, Tjq (399)
j “ j ùñ S9|Tj Ď LVispS9, Tjq (400)
Tj ăS9 Tk ùñ S9|Tk Ę LVispS9, Tjq (401)
p399q ^ p400q ^ p401q ùñ LVispS9, Tjq “ S9
˛|Ti ¨ S9|Tj (402)
p402q ùñ LVispS9, Tjq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok i, rjpxq Ñ 1,wjpxq2 Ñ ok js (403)
p414q ^ p6q ùñ LVispS9, Tjq is legal (404)
p404q ùñ Tj in S9 is last-use legal in S9 (405)
(406)
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Ti ăS9 Tk ^ p398q ùñ S9
˛|Ti Ď LVispS9, Tkq or S9
˛|Ti Ę LVispS9, Tkq (407)
p407q ùñ S9
˛|Ti Ę LVispS9, Tkq (408)
wjpxq2 Ñ ok j is closing write on x in Tj ùñ Tj is decided on x in S9 (409)
Tj ăS9 Tk ^ p409q ùñ S9
˛|Tj Ď LVispS9, Tkq or S9
˛|Tj Ę LVispS9, Tkq (410)
p410q ùñ S9
˛|Tj Ę LVispS9, Tkq (411)
k “ k ùñ S9|Tk Ď LVispS9, Tkq (412)
p408q ^ p411q ^ p412q ùñ LVispS9, Tkq “ S9|Tk (413)
p413q ùñ LVispS9, Tkq|x “ rrjpxq Ñ 0s (414)
p414q ^ p1q ùñ LVispS9, Tkq is legal (415)
p415q ùñ Tk in S9 is last-use legal in S9 (416)
p387q ^ p390q ^ p397q ^ p405q ^ p416q ùñ H9 is final-state last-use opaque (417)
Let P 91 be a prefix s.t. H9 “ P 91 ¨ rreskp0qs.
Lemma 51. P 91 is final-state last-use opaque.
Proof.
let C91 “ ComplpP 91 q “ P 91 ¨ rtryAj Ñ Aj , reskpAkqs (418)
let S91 “ C91 |Ti ¨ C91 |Tj ¨ C91 |Tk (419)
S91 ” C91 (420)
real time order ăP 91“ tTi ăP 91 Tku (421)
real time order ăS91“ tTi ăS91 Tj , Ti ăS91 Tk, Tj ăS91 Tku (422)
p421q ^ p422q ùñăS91ĎăP 91 (423)
i “ i ùñ S91 |Ti Ď LVispS91 , Tiq (424)
Ti ăS91 Tj ùñ S91 |Tj Ę LVispS91 , Tiq (425)
Ti ăS91 Tk ùñ S91 |Tk Ę LVispS91 , Tiq (426)
p424q ^ p425q ^ p426q ùñ LVispS91 , Tiq “ S91 |Ti (427)
p427q ùñ LVispS91 , Tiq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok is (428)
p428q ^ p2q ùñ LVispS91 , Tiq is legal (429)
p429q ùñ Ti in S91 is last-use legal in S91 (430)
(431)
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wipxq1 Ñ ok i is closing write on x in Ti ùñ Ti is decided on x in S91 (432)
Ti ăS91 Tj ^ p432q ùñ S91
˛|Ti Ď LVispS91 , Tjq (433)
j “ j ùñ S91 |Tj Ď LVispS91 , Tjq (434)
Tj ăS91 Tk ùñ S91 |Tk Ę LVispS91 , Tjq (435)
p433q ^ p434q ^ p435q ùñ LVispS91 , Tjq “ S91
˛|Ti ¨ S91 |Tj (436)
p436q ùñ LVispS91 , Tjq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok i, rjpxq Ñ 1,wjpxq2 Ñ ok js (437)
p447q ^ p6q ùñ LVispS91 , Tjq is legal (438)
p438q ùñ Tj in S91 is last-use legal in S91 (439)
Ti ăS91 Tk ^ p432q ùñ S91
˛|Ti Ď LVispS91 , Tkq or S91
˛|Ti Ę LVispS91 , Tkq (440)
p440q ùñ S91
˛|Ti Ę LVispS91 , Tkq (441)
wjpxq2 Ñ ok j is closing write on x in Tj ùñ Tj is decided on x in S91 (442)
Tj ăS91 Tk ^ p442q ùñ S91
˛|Tj Ď LVispS91 , Tkq or S91
˛|Tj Ę LVispS91 , Tkq (443)
p443q ùñ S91
˛|Tj Ę LVispS91 , Tkq (444)
k “ k ùñ S91 |Tk Ď LVispS91 , Tkq (445)
p441q ^ p444q ^ p445q ùñ LVispS91 , Tkq “ S91 |Tk (446)
p446q ùñ LVispS91 , Tkq|x “ rrkpxq Ñ Aks (447)
p447q ^ p??q ùñ LVispS91 , Tkq is legal (448)
p448q ùñ Tk in S91 is last-use legal in S91 (449)
p420q ^ p423q ^ p430q ^ p439q ^ p449q ùñ P 91 is final-state last-use opaque (450)
Let P 92 be a prefix s.t. H9 “ P 92 ¨ rrkpxq Ñ 0s.
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Proof.
let C92 “ ComplpP 92 q “ P 92 ¨ rresjpAjq, reskpAjqs (451)
let S92 “ C92 |Ti ¨ C92 |Tj ¨ C92 |Tk (452)
S92 ” C92 (453)
real time order ăP 92“ tTi ăP 92 Tku (454)
real time order ăS92“ tTi ăS92 Tj , Ti ăS92 Tk, Tj ăS92 Tku (455)
p454q ^ p455q ùñăS92ĎăP 92 (456)
i “ i ùñ S92 |Ti Ď LVispS92 , Tiq (457)
Ti ăS92 Tj ùñ S92 |Tj Ę LVispS92 , Tiq (458)
Ti ăS92 Tk ùñ S92 |Tk Ę LVispS92 , Tiq (459)
p457q ^ p458q ^ p459q ùñ LVispS92 , Tiq “ S92 |Ti (460)
p460q ùñ LVispS92 , Tiq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok is (461)
p461q ^ p2q ùñ LVispS92 , Tiq is legal (462)
p462q ùñ Ti in S92 is last-use legal in S92 (463)
wipxq1 Ñ ok i is closing write on x in Ti ùñ Ti is decided on x in S92 (464)
Ti ăS92 Tj ^ p464q ùñ S92
˛|Ti Ď LVispS92 , Tjq (465)
j “ j ùñ S92 |Tj Ď LVispS92 , Tjq (466)
Tj ăS92 Tk ùñ S92 |Tk Ę LVispS92 , Tjq (467)
p465q ^ p466q ^ p467q ùñ LVispS92 , Tjq “ S92
˛|Ti ¨ S92 |Tj (468)
p468q ùñ LVispS92 , Tjq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok i, rjpxq Ñ 1,wjpxq2 Ñ ok js (469)
p479q ^ p6q ùñ LVispS92 , Tjq is legal (470)
p470q ùñ Tj in S92 is last-use legal in S92 (471)
Ti ăS92 Tk ^ p464q ùñ S92
˛|Ti Ď LVispS92 , Tkq or S92
˛|Ti Ę LVispS92 , Tkq (472)
p472q ùñ S92
˛|Ti Ę LVispS92 , Tkq (473)
wjpxq2 Ñ ok j is closing write on x in Tj ùñ Tj is decided on x in S92 (474)
Tj ăS92 Tk ^ p474q ùñ S92
˛|Tj Ď LVispS92 , Tkq or S92
˛|Tj Ę LVispS92 , Tkq (475)
p475q ùñ S92
˛|Tj Ę LVispS92 , Tkq (476)
k “ k ùñ S92 |Tk Ď LVispS92 , Tkq (477)
p473q ^ p476q ^ p477q ùñ LVispS92 , Tkq “ S92 |Tk (478)
p478q ùñ LVispS92 , Tkq|x “ ∅ (479)
p479q ^ p8q ùñ LVispS92 , Tkq is legal (480)
p480q ùñ Tk in S92 is last-use legal in S92 (481)
p453q ^ p456q ^ p463q ^ p471q ^ p481q ùñ P 92 is final-state last-use opaque (482)
(483)
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Let P 92 be a prefix s.t. H9 “ P 92 ¨ rresjpok jq, rkpxq Ñ 0s.
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Proof.
let C93 “ ComplpP 93 q “ P 93 ¨ rresjpAjq, reskpAjqs (484)
let S93 “ C93 |Ti ¨ C93 |Tj ¨ C93 |Tk (485)
S93 ” C93 (486)
real time order ăP 93“ tTi ăP 93 Tku (487)
real time order ăS93“ tTi ăS93 Tj , Ti ăS93 Tk, Tj ăS93 Tku (488)
p487q ^ p488q ùñăS93ĎăP 93 (489)
i “ i ùñ S93 |Ti Ď LVispS93 , Tiq (490)
Ti ăS93 Tj ùñ S93 |Tj Ę LVispS93 , Tiq (491)
Ti ăS93 Tk ùñ S93 |Tk Ę LVispS93 , Tiq (492)
p490q ^ p491q ^ p492q ùñ LVispS93 , Tiq “ S93 |Ti (493)
p493q ùñ LVispS93 , Tiq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok is (494)
p494q ^ p2q ùñ LVispS93 , Tiq is legal (495)
p495q ùñ Ti in S93 is last-use legal in S93 (496)
wipxq1 Ñ ok i is closing write on x in Ti ùñ Ti is decided on x in S93 (497)
Ti ăS93 Tj ^ p497q ùñ S93
˛|Ti Ď LVispS93 , Tjq (498)
j “ j ùñ S93 |Tj Ď LVispS93 , Tjq (499)
Tj ăS93 Tk ùñ S93 |Tk Ę LVispS93 , Tjq (500)
p498q ^ p499q ^ p500q ùñ LVispS93 , Tjq “ S93
˛|Ti ¨ S93 |Tj (501)
p501q ùñ LVispS93 , Tjq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok i, rjpxq Ñ 1,wjpxq2 Ñ Ajs (502)
p512q ^ p7q ùñ LVispS93 , Tjq is legal (503)
p503q ùñ Tj in S93 is last-use legal in S93 (504)
Ti ăS93 Tk ^ p497q ùñ S93
˛|Ti Ď LVispS93 , Tkq or S93
˛|Ti Ę LVispS93 , Tkq (505)
p505q ùñ S93
˛|Ti Ę LVispS93 , Tkq (506)
wjpxq2 Ñ ok j is closing write on x in Tj ùñ Tj is decided on x in S93 (507)
Tj ăS93 Tk ^ p507q ùñ S93
˛|Tj Ď LVispS93 , Tkq or S93
˛|Tj Ę LVispS93 , Tkq (508)
p508q ùñ S93
˛|Tj Ę LVispS93 , Tkq (509)
k “ k ùñ S93 |Tk Ď LVispS93 , Tkq (510)
p506q ^ p509q ^ p510q ùñ LVispS93 , Tkq “ S93 |Tk (511)
p511q ùñ LVispS93 , Tkq|x “ ∅ (512)
p512q ^ p8q ùñ LVispS93 , Tkq is legal (513)
p513q ùñ Tk in S93 is last-use legal in S93 (514)
p486q ^ p489q ^ p496q ^ p504q ^ p514q ùñ P 93 is final-state last-use opaque (515)
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Let P 94 be a prefix s.t. H9 “ P 94 ¨ rwjpxq2 Ñ ok j , rkpxq Ñ 0s.
Lemma 52. P 94 is final-state last-use opaque.
Proof.
let C94 “ ComplpP 94 q “ P 94 ¨ rresjpAjq, reskpAjqs (516)
let S94 “ C94 |Ti ¨ C94 |Tj ¨ C94 |Tk (517)
S94 ” C94 (518)
real time order ăP 94“ tTi ăP 94 Tku (519)
real time order ăS94“ tTi ăS94 Tj , Ti ăS94 Tk, Tj ăS94 Tku (520)
p520q ^ p520q ùñăS94ĎăP 94 (521)
i “ i ùñ S94 |Ti Ď LVispS94 , Tiq (522)
Ti ăS94 Tj ùñ S94 |Tj Ę LVispS94 , Tiq (523)
Ti ăS94 Tk ùñ S94 |Tk Ę LVispS94 , Tiq (524)
p522q ^ p523q ^ p524q ùñ LVispS94 , Tiq “ S94 |Ti (525)
p525q ùñ LVispS94 , Tiq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok is (526)
p526q ^ p2q ùñ LVispS94 , Tiq is legal (527)
p527q ùñ Ti in S94 is last-use legal in S94 (528)
wipxq1 Ñ ok i is closing write on x in Ti ùñ Ti is decided on x in S94 (529)
Ti ăS94 Tj ^ p529q ùñ S94
˛|Ti Ď LVispS94 , Tjq (530)
j “ j ùñ S94 |Tj Ď LVispS94 , Tjq (531)
Tj ăS94 Tk ùñ S94 |Tk Ę LVispS94 , Tjq (532)
p530q ^ p531q ^ p532q ùñ LVispS94 , Tjq “ S94
˛|Ti ¨ S94 |Tj (533)
p533q ùñ LVispS94 , Tjq|x “ rwipxq1 Ñ ok i, rjpxq Ñ 1s (534)
p545q ^ p4q ùñ LVispS94 , Tjq is legal (535)
p535q ùñ Tj in S94 is last-use legal in S94 (536)
(537)
73
Ti ăS94 Tk ^ p529q ùñ S94
˛|Ti Ď LVispS94 , Tkq or S94
˛|Ti Ę LVispS94 , Tkq (538)
p538q ùñ S94
˛|Ti Ę LVispS94 , Tkq (539)
wjpxq2 Ñ ok j is closing write on x in Tj ùñ Tj is decided on x in S94 (540)
Tj ăS94 Tk ^ p540q ùñ S94
˛|Tj Ď LVispS94 , Tkq or S94
˛|Tj Ę LVispS94 , Tkq (541)
p541q ùñ S94
˛|Tj Ę LVispS94 , Tkq (542)
k “ k ùñ S94 |Tk Ď LVispS94 , Tkq (543)
p539q ^ p542q ^ p543q ùñ LVispS94 , Tkq “ S94 |Tk (544)
p544q ùñ LVispS94 , Tkq|x “ ∅ (545)
p545q ^ p8q ùñ LVispS94 , Tkq is legal (546)
p546q ùñ Tk in S94 is last-use legal in S94 (547)
(548)
p518q ^ p521q ^ p528q ^ p536q ^ p547q ùñ P 94 is final-state last-use opaque (549)
Let P 95 be a prefix s.t. H9 “ P 95 ¨ rstartk,wjpxq2 Ñ ok j , rkpxq Ñ 0s.
Lemma 53. P 94 is final-state last-use opaque.
Proof.
P 95 “ P 32 ^ Lemma 28 (550)
Let P 9p be any prefix of P
9
5 .
Lemma 54. P 9p is final-state last-use opaque.
Proof.
H1 “ P 14 ¨R^ Corollary 9 ùñ P 14 is last-use plague (551)
P 14 “ P 33 ^ p551q ùñ P 9p is last-use lopaque (552)
p552q ùñ P 9p is final-state last-use lopaque (553)
Lemma 55. H9 is last-use opaque.
Proof. Since, from Lemmas 51–54, all prefixes of H9 are final-state last-use opaque, then by
Def. 22 H9 is last-use opaque.
Corollary 10. Any prefix of H9 is last-use opaque.
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Ti
start i ripxq Ñ0 wipyq1 tryC i ÑCi
Tj
startj wjpxq2 tryC j ÑCj
Tk
startk rkpxq Ñ0 wkpzq3 tryC k Ak
Tl
start l rlpxq Ñ2 rlpyq Ñ0 rlpzq3 tryC lÑAl
Figure 37: TMS1 history example [11].
B Property Comparison
VWC is incomparable to last-use opacity.
Lemma 56. There exists a last-use–opaque history H that is not virtual world consistent.
sketch. Since, as an extension of by Lemma 21, last-use opacity supports early release, then
by Def. 3 and (by Def. 5) from Lemma 55 there exists some last-use–opaque history where
some transaction reads from a live transaction and aborts. Since, by Theorem 8 VWC, does
not support aborting releasing transactions, then, by the same definitions, such a history is
not VWC. Hence a history with a transaction releasing early may be last-use–opaque but
not VWC.
Theorem 17. There exists a virtual world consistent history H that is not last-use–opaque.
sketch. Since each transaction in a VWC history can be explained by a different causal past
from other transactions, it is possible that in a correct VWC history transactions do not
agree on the order of operations in the sequential witness history. However, in order for H
to to be last-use–opaque the legality of transactions needs to be established using a single
sequential history with a single order of operations. Thus, it is possible for a VWC history
not to be last-use–opaque.
Since TMS1 is incomparable to last-use opacity.
Theorem 18. There exists a last-use–opaque history H that is not TMS1.
sketch. Since, as an extension of by Lemma 21, last-use opacity supports early release, then
by Def. 3 and 2 there exist histories that are last-use–opaque where some transaction reads
from a live transaction. Since, by Theorem 5 TMS1, does not support early release, then,
by the same definitions, histories containing early release are not TMS1. Hence a history
with a transaction releasing early may be last-use–opaque but not TMS1.
Theorem 19. There exists a TMS1 history H that is not last-use–opaque.
sketch. Let history H be the history presented in Fig. 37. In [11] (Fig. 6 therein) the authors
show that the history satisfies TMS1. The same history is not last-use opaque. Note that
if VispS, Tiq is to be legal, in any S equivalent to H, Ti ăS Tj , because Ti reads 0 from x
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Ti
start i ripzq0 wipxq1 ripyq0 wipyq1 tryC iÑCi
Tj
startj rjpxq1 wipxq2 tryC jÑCj
Figure 38: Last-use–opaque history that does not satisfy elastic opacity.
and Tj writes 2 to x (and commits). In addition, Tj ăS Tl, because Tl reads 2 from x and
Tk ăS Tl, because Tl reads z from Tk. Then, by extension Ti ăS Tj ăS Tl. However, note
that in any S it must be that Tl ăS Ti, because Tl reads y from Ti, which is a contradiction.
Thus, H is not last-use opaque.
TMS2 is strictly stronger than last-use opacity.
Proposition 1. All TMS2 histories are last-use–opaque.
sketch. The authors of [11] believe (but do not demonstrate) that all opaque histories satisfy
TMS2. If this is the case, then, since all opaque histories are last-use–opaque (Lemma 9),
then it is true that all last-use–opaque histories satisfy TMS2. Thus, we believe the propo-
sition is true, pending a demonstration that all opaque histories satisfy TMS2.
Last-use Opacity and elastic opacity are incomparable.
Lemma 57. There exists an elastic opaque history H that is not last-use–opaque.
sketch. Since elastic opaque histories may not be serializable [13], and since, as all last-use–
opaque histories trivially require serializability then some elastic opaque histories are not
last-use–opaque.
Lemma 58. There exists a last-use–opaque history H that is not elastic opaque.
sketch. Let history H be the history presented in Fig. 38. It should be straightforward to see
that H is last-use–opaque for an equivalent sequential history S “ H|Ti ¨H|Tj . Operations
on z are always justified in any sequential equivalent history since they are all within Ti and
their effects are not visible in Tj . The read operation on y is expected to read 0 since it is
not preceded in S by any write, and it does read 0. Thus operations on y and z will not
break legality of either Ti or Tj . With that in mind, the history can be shown to be last-use
opaque by analogy to Lemma 21.
On the other hand, let Ti be an elastic transaction. The only possible well-formed
cut of H|Ti is Ci “ trr pzq0,w pxq1, r pyq0, w pyq1su. (In particular, the following cut is
not well-formed, since w pxq1 and w pyq0 are in two different subhistories of the cut: C 1i “trr pzq0,w pxq1s, rr pyq0, w pyq1su). Let fCpHq be a cutting function that applies cut C. Then,
since the cut contains only one subhistory, it should be straightforward to see that fCpHq “
H. Then, we note that H contains an operation in H|Tj that reads the value of x from H|Ti
and Ti is live. That means that in the prefix P of H s.t. H “ P ¨ rtryC iÑCi, tryC jÑCjs
both transactions will be aborted in any completion of P , so for any sequential equivalent
history S VispS, Tiq will not contain S|Tj , since either Tj is aborted in any S. Therefore
VispS, Tiq will not justify reading 1 from x and will not be legal, causing P not to be final
state opaque (Def. 7), which in turn means that H is not opaque (Def. 8).
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Ti
start i wipxq1 tryC iÑCi
Tk
startk rkpxq1 rkpyq3 tryC kÑAk
Tj
startj wjpxq2 wipyq3 tryC jÑCj
Figure 39: ACA history that does not satisfy elastic last-use opacity.
Last-use opacity is strictly stronger than recoverability.
Lemma 59. Any last-use–opaque history H is recoverable.
sketch. Let us assume that H is not recoverable. Then there must be some transactions Ti
and Tj s.t. Tj reads from Ti and then Tj commits before Ti. By analogy to Lemma 25,
such a history will contain a prefix P where any completion will contain an aborted Ti and
a committed Tj , so for any equivalent sequential history S VispS, Tjq will not contain S|Ti.
Since Ti reads from Ti then such VispS, Tjq will not be legal, so by Def. 21 P is not last-use
opaque and thus, by Def. 22, H is not last-use opaque, which is a contradiction.
ACA is incomparable to last-use opacity.
Lemma 60. There exists a last-use–opaque history H that does not avoid cascading aborts.
sketch. Lemma 21 demonstrates that H1 is last-use–opaque. However, since Ti reads from
Tj in H1 and rjpxq Ñ v ăH1 tryC i Ñ Ci the history is not ACA, since it contradicts
Def. 15.
Lemma 61. There exists an ACA history H that is not last-use–opaque.
sketch. The history in Fig. 39 is shown to be ACA in [4]. However, note, that ComplpHq “
H, and given any sequential S ” ComplpHq Tk Tk must follow both Ti and Tk in S because
Tk reads form both transactions. Since Ti ărtH Tj and Ti ărtH Tk, then Ti must precede both
other transactions in S. Hence, S “ H|Ti ¨ H|Tj ¨ H|Tk, so VispS, Tkq “ S and therefore
VispS, Tkq is illegal because rkpxq Ñ 1 is preceded in VispS, Tkq|x by rkpxq Ñ 2.
Strictness and last-use opacity are also incomparable.
Theorem 20. There exists a last-use–opaque history H that is not strict.
sketch. Since any strict history is also ACA [4], and since Lemma 60 shows that not all
last-use–opaque histories are ACA, then not all last-use–opaque histories are strict.
Theorem 21. There exists a strict history H that is not last-use–opaque.
sketch. The history in Fig. 39 is shown to be strict in [4]. However, as we show in Lemma 61,
this history is not last-use–opaque.
Rigorousness is strictly stronger than last-use opacity.
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Lemma 62. Any rigorous history H is last-use–opaque.
sketch. Since [4] demonstrates that rigorous histories are opaque, and since we show in
Lemma 9 that opaque histories are also last-use–opaque, then all rigorous histories are
last-use–opaque.
Live opacity is stronger than last-use opacity.
Lemma 63. Any live opaque history H is last-use–opaque.
sketch. Since H is live opaque there exists a sequential history S that justifies serializability
of H and an extension S1 of S where if transaction Ti is not in S then it is replaced in S1
by T gri containing only non-local reads. S
1 is legal and preserves the real-time order of H
(accounting for replaced transactions). In addition, from Theorem 11, no transaction in H
reads from a live transaction (in any prefix of H). Therefore, since S1 is legal, any read
operation opi “ ripxq Ñ v in H that is preceded wjpxqv Ñ u in H, Tj is committed in S
and is included in S1 in full.
Let S2 be a sequential history constructed by replacing the operations removed to create
S1 where if Ti P H and Ti ­
ş
S then Ti is aborted in S
2. S2 preserves the real time order
of H and S2 ” H. Note that, since S1 is legal, if some write opw is in S2 and not in S1,
then there is no non-local read operation opr reading the value written by opw. Hence any
operation reading the value written by opw is local, and since all local reads in transactions
that are replaced in S1 read legal values (by Def. 12), then all reads reading from any opw
read legal values in S2. Since S1 is legal, then all reads reading from transactions that are in
S read legal values in S1. Since S2 ” H, then these read and write operations also read legal
values in S2. Because of this, and since no transaction reads from another live transaction,
VispS2, Tiq will be legal for any transaction in S2. In addition, LVispS2, Tiq will be legal
for any aborted transaction in S2. Therefore any live opaque H will be final state last-use
opaque. Since any prefix of H is also live opaque, then any prefix will also be final-state
last-use opaque, hence H is opaque.
C β–last-use opacity
Definition 26 (β-Closing Write Invocation). Given a program P, a set of processes Π
executing P and a history H s.t. H |ù EpP,Πq, i.e. H P HP,Π, an invocation inv ipw pxqvq is
the closing write invocation on some variable x by transaction Ti in H, if for any history
H 1 P HP,Π for which H is a prefix (i.e., H 1 “ H ¨R) there is no operation invocation inv 1 s.t.
inv ipw pxqvq precedes inv 1 in H 1|Ti where (a) inv 1 “ inv ipw pxquq or (b) inv 1 “ inv iptryAq.
Definition 27 (β-Closing Write). Given program P, a set of processes Π executing P and
history H s.t. H |ù EpP,Πq, an operation execution is the closing write on some variable x
by transaction Ti in H if it comprises of an invocation and a response other than Ai, and
the invocation is the β-closing write invocation on x by Ti in H.
Definition 28 (Transaction β´Decided on x). Given a program P, a set of processes Π
and a history H s.t. H |ù EpP,Πq, we say transaction Ti P H β-decided on variable x in H
iff H|Ti contains a complete write operation execution wipxqv Ñ ok i that is the β-closing
write on x.
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Given some history H, let TˆHβ be a set of transactions s.t. Ti P TˆHβ iff there is some
variable x s.t. Ti β-decided on x in H.
Given any Ti P H, H |ˆβTi is the longest subsequence of H|Ti s.t.:
a) H |ˆβTi contains start i Ñ u, and
b) for any variable x, if Ti β-decided on x in H, then H |ˆβTi contains pH|Tiq|x.
In addition, H
˛|βTi is a sequence s.t. H
˛|βTi “ H |ˆβTi ¨ rtryC i Ñ Cis.
Given a sequential history S s.t. S ” H, βLVispS, Tiq is the longest subhistory of S, s.t.
for each Tj P S:
a) S|Tj Ď βLVispS, Tiq if i “ j or Tj is committed in S, or
b) S
˛|βTj Ď βLVispS, Tiq if Tj is not committed in S but Tj P TˆHβ .
Given a sequential history S and a transaction Ti P S, we then say that transaction Ti
is β–last-use legal in S if βLVispS, Tiq is legal.
Definition 29 (Final-state β–Last-use Opacity). A finite history H is final-state β–last-use
opaque if, and only if, there exists a sequential history S equivalent to any completion of H
s.t.,
a) S preserves the real-time order of H,
b) every transaction in S that is committed in S is legal in S,
c) every transaction in S that is not committed in S is β–last-use legal in S.
Definition 30 (β–Last-use Opacity). A history H is β–last-use opaque if, and only if, every
finite prefix of H is final-state β–last-use opaque.
D SVA Correctness Proof
Since the values used within writes are under the control of the program (rather than SVA)
we simply assume that they are within the domain of the variables.
Assumption 1 (Values Within Domain). For any transaction Ti in any SVA history H
given variable x with the domain of D, if wipxqv Ñ u P H|Ti, then v P D.
Definition 31 (Direct Precedence). For operations opi, opj P H, opj ăăH opi iff opj ăH
opi and Eopk P H s.t. opj ăH opk ăH opi.
Definition 32 (Operation Execution Conditional). Given predicate P and operation op
P ã op denotes that P is true only if op executes.
Definition 33 (Operation Execution Converse). Given predicate P and operation op P â
op denotes that op executes only if P is true.
Let there be any P,Π, H |ù EpP,Πq, opi P H|Ti.
Definition 34. opi is closing access on x in Ti, denoted opi “ :opxi if both:
79
a) opi is closing read on x in Ti or opi is closing write on x in Ti, and
b) Eop1i P H s.t. opi ăH op1i and op1i is closing read on x in Ti or op1i is closing write on
x in Ti.
Let there be any P,Π, H |ù EpP,Πq, opi P H|Ti, opi “
#
ripxq Ñ v ,
wipxqv Ñ ok i.
Lemma 64 (Access Condition). lvpxq “ pvipxq ´ 1 â opi.
Proof. Condition at line 13 dominates access at line 17.
Lemma 65 (Abort Condition). ltvpxq “ pvipxq ´ 1 â resipAiq.
Proof. Access condition at line 27 dominates dismiss at line 28 in procedure abort for each
variable. Hence, all variables must pass line 27 before abort concludes.
Lemma 66 (Commit Condition). ltvpxq “ pvipxq ´ 1 â resipCiq.
Proof. By analogy to Lemma 65.
Lemma 67 (Early Release). If opi “ :opxi then lvpxq “ pvipxq ã opi.
Proof. lvpxq can be set by Ti at line 21 and at line 58. The former is set during the last
access on some x in Tj (line 19 dominates line 21). The latter is set during commit, which
means that if any closing access was present, it was executed prior to commit.
Let ri “
#
resipAiq,
resipCiq.
Lemma 68 (Release). If Eop1i P H|Ti s.t. op1i “ :opxi and x P ASetpTiq then lvpxq “
pvipxq ã ri.
Proof. If op1i is not closing access then line 19 will not be passed, so only assignment of
lvpxq is in line 58 which execute only during commit or abort.
Lemma 69 (Terminal Release). If x P ASetpTiq then lvpxq “ pvipxq ã ri.
Proof. ltvpxq can be set only in line 31 or line 43, which are part of abort and commit,
respectively.
Let there be any H, Ti P H, Tj P H, opi P H|Ti, opi “ ripxq Ñ u, opj P H|Tj ,
opj “ wjpxqv Ñ ok j .
Lemma 70 (No Buffering). If opj ăăH|x opi and not opj ăH resjpAjq ăH opi then u “ v.
Lemma 71 (Revert On Abort). If opj ăăH|x opi and opj ăH resjpAjq ăH opi then u ‰ v.
Proof. If abort is executed then the restore procedure is executed for all x P ASetpTiq. Thus,
line 63 restores x to value v 1 which is acquired before the any operation on x is executed by
Ti, hence v
1 ‰ v , so u ‰ v .
Let H|start be a subhistory of H that for each Tj P H contains only the operation startj .
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Lemma 72 (Consecutive Versions). If x P ASetpTiq X ASetpTjq and inv ipstart iq ăăH|start
inv ipstartjq then pvipxq ´ 1 “ pvjpxq.
Proof. If Ti returns at line 3 for x then no Tj s.t. x P ASetpTjq returns at line 3 until Ti
executes line 9 for x. Hence, Ti alone increments gvpxq at line 5 and sets pvipxq to the new
value of gvpxq. If start i ăăH|start startj then Ti will return at line 3 and Tj will return next.
No other transaction will return at line 3 between Ti and Tj .
Lemma 73 (Unique Versions). If x P ASetpTiq XASetpTjq then pvipxq ‰ pvjpxq.
Proof. From Lemma 72.
Lemma 74 (Monotonic Versions). If x P ASetpTiq X ASetpTjq and inv ipstart iq ăH|start
inv ipstartjq then pvipxq ă pvjpxq.
Proof. From Lemma 72, Lemma 73.
Definition 35 (Version Order). Let ăx be an order s.t. Ti ăx Tj iff pvipxq ă pvjpxq.
Lemma 75 (Forced Abort Condition). rvipxq ă cvpxq ã resipAiq.
Proof. Condition at line 15 dominates abort at line 16. Condition at line 39 dominates
abort at line 40.
Let there be any P,Π, H |ù EpP,Πq, opi P H|Ti, opi “
#
ripxq Ñ v ,
wipxqv Ñ ok i.
Lemma 76. cvpxq ă rvipxq â opi.
Proof. Condition at line 15 dominates abort at line 16.
Lemma 77 (Current Version Early Release). If opi “ :opxi then cvpxq “ rvipxq ã opi.
Proof. By analogy to Lemma 67.
Lemma 78 (Current Version Release). If Eopi P H|Ti s.t. opi “ :opxi and x P ASetpTiq
then cvpxq “ rvipxq ã ri.
Proof. By analogy to Lemma 68.
Lemma 79. cvpxq “ rvipxq â resipAiq.
Proof. From Lemma 68 and Lemma 78.
Let there be any P,Π, H |ù EpP,Πq, Ti P H, Tj P H, opi P H|Ti, opj P H|Tj , opi “#
ripxq Ñ v ,
wipxqv Ñ ok i, opj “
#
rjpxq Ñ v ,
wjpxqv Ñ ok j .
Lemma 80 (Access Order). pvipxq ă pvjpxq ô opi ăH opj.
Proof. From Lemma 64 and Lemma 74.
Let there be any H, Ti P H, Tj P H, opi P H|Ti, opi “ ripxq Ñ u, opj P H|Tj ,
opj “ wjpxqv Ñ ok j .
Let there be any P,Π, H |ù EpP,Πq.
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Lemma 81 (Access Prefix). If lvpxq “ pvjpxq then @Tk P H s.t. pvkpxq ă pvipxq either
reskpCkq P H|Tk, reskpAkq P H|Tk, or :opxk P H|Tk.
Proof.
@Tl, Tk P H s.t. pvlpxq “ pvkpxq ´ 1 : (554)
Lemma 64 ùñ lvpxq “ pvkpxq ´ 1 â opk (555)
p554q ^ p555q ùñ lvpxq “ pvlpxq â opk (556)
Lemma 67 ùñ lvpxq “ pvlpxq ã :opxl (557)
Lemma 68 ùñ lvpxq “ pvlpxq ã r where r “ resipAiq or r “ resipCiq (558)
p557q ^ p558q ùñ Tl is committed, aborted or decided on x (559)
Trivially extends for any Tl, Tk s.t. pvlpxq ă pvkpxq.
Lemma 82 (C). If ltvpxq “ pvjpxq then @Tk P H s.t. pvkpxq ă pvipxq either reskpCkq P
H|Tk, or reskpAkq P H|Tk.
Proof.
@Tl, Tk P H s.t. pvlpxq “ pvkpxq ´ 1 : (560)
Lemma 66 ùñ ltvpxq “ pvkpxq ´ 1 â reskpCiq (561)
p560q ^ p561q ùñ ltvpxq “ pvlpxq â opk (562)
Lemma 69 ùñ ltvpxq “ pvlpxq ã r where r “ resipAiq or r “ resipCiq (563)
p563q ùñ Tl is committed or aborted (564)
Trivially extends for any Tl, Tk s.t. pvlpxq ă pvkpxq.
Let there be any H, Ti P H, Tj P H, opi P H|Ti, opi “ ripxq Ñ u, opj P H|Tj ,
opj “ wjpxqv Ñ ok j .
Lemma 83 (Forced Abort). If x P ASetpTiq X ASetpTjq and resjpAjq P H|Tj and opi ăH
resjpAjq then resipAiq P H|Ti.
Proof.
resjpAjq P H|Tj ^ Lemma 79 ùñ cvpxq “ pvjxâ resjpAjq (565)
Lemma 74 ùñ pvjpxq ă pvipxq (566)
p565q ^ p566q ùñ cvpxq ă pvixâ resjpAjq (567)
Lemma 76 ùñ cvpxq “ rvipxq â opi ùñ rvipxq “ pvjpxq (568)
p568q ^ p566q ùñ rvipxq ą pvipxq (569)
p569q ^ p567q ùñ rvipxq ă cvpxq (570)
p570q ùñ rvipxq ă cvpxq ã resipAiq ùñ resipAiq P H|Ti (571)
Let there be any P,Π, H |ù EpP,Πq, Ti P H, Tj P H, opi P H|Ti, opj P H|Tj , opi “#
ripxq Ñ v ,
wipxqv Ñ ok i, opj “
#
rjpxq Ñ v ,
wjpxqv Ñ ok j .
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Definition 36 (Completion Construction). HC “ ComplpHq s.t. @Tk P H, reskpCkq R
H|Tk ô reskpAkq P HC |Tk
Definition 37 (Sequential History Construction). SˆH is a sequential history s.t. SˆH ” HC
and Ti ăHC Tj ùñ Ti ăSˆH Tj and Ti ăx Tj ùñ Ti ăSˆH Tj.
Let there be any H, Ti P H, Tj P H, opi P H|Ti, opi “ ripxq Ñ u, opj P H|Tj ,
opj “ wjpxqv Ñ ok j .
Lemma 84. If Ti reads x from Tj then Tj is committed in H or Tj is decided on x in H.
Proof.
Ti reads x from Tj ùñ opi “ ripxq Ñ v ^ opj “ wjpxqv Ñ ok i ^ opj ăH opi (572)
Lemma 64 ùñ lvpxq “ pvxp´q1 â opi (573)
Lemma 80^ opj ăH opi ùñ pvjpxq ă pvipxq (574)
p574q ^ Lemma 81 ùñ Tj is committed, aborted, or decided on x (575)
Let us assume that Tj is aborted:
opi ă resjpAjq : Lemma 72 ùñ v ‰ v ùñ contradiction (576)
resjpAjq ăH opi : Lemma 67 ùñ lvpxq “ pvxpãqopi ^ opi “ :opxi (577)
Thus, Ti is committed or decided on x.
Corollary 11. If P is any prefix of H, then if Ti reads x from Tj in P then Tj is committed
in P or Tj is decided on x in P .
Lemma 85. If Ti reads x from Tj and Tj is committed in H then Tj is committed in H.
Proof.
Ti reads x from Tj ùñ opi “ ripxq Ñ v ^ opj “ wjpxqv Ñ ok i ^ opj ăH opi (578)
Lemma 66 ùñ ltvpxq “ pvkpxq ´ 1 â resipok iq (579)
Lemma 80^ opj ăH opi ùñ pvjpxq ă pvipxq (580)
Lemma 82^ p579q ^ p580q ùñ r P H|Tj where r “ resjpAjq or r “ resjpCjq (581)
Lemma 83 ùñ if resjpAjq P H|Tj then resjpAjq P H|Tj ùñ contradition (582)
p582q ùñ resipAiq P H|Ti (583)
Let there be any P,Π, H |ù EpP,Πq, Ti P H, opi “ ripxq Ñ v , opi P H|Ti.
Lemma 86. If resipCiq P SˆH |Ti then Dopj “ wjpxqv Ñ ok j P VispSˆH , Tiq.
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Proof. If i “ j then trivially opj P VispSˆH , Tiq. Otherwise:
i ‰ j ^ Lemma 70 ùñ DTj ^ opj P HC |Tj (584)
p584q ^ Lemma 85^ resipCiq P HC |Ti ùñ DresjpCjq P HC |Tj (585)
Def. 37^ p585q ùñ resjpCjq P SˆH |Tj ^ Tj ăSˆH Ti (586)
p586q ùñ SˆH |Tj Ď VispSˆH , Tiq ùñ opj P VispSˆH , Tiq (587)
Lemma 87. Dopj “ wjpxqv Ñ ok j P LVispSˆH , Tiq.
Proof. If i “ j then trivially opj P LVispSˆH , Tiq. Otherwise:
i ‰ j ^ Lemma 70 ùñ DTj ^ opj P HC |Tj (588)
p588q ^ Lemma 84^ resipCiq P HC |Ti ùñ either DresjpCjq P HC |Tj or D :opxj P HC |Tj
(589)
Def. 37^ p589q ùñ resjpCjq P SˆH |Tj ^ Tj ăSˆH Ti (590)
p590q ùñ SˆH |Tj Ď LVispSˆH , Tiq ùñ opj P LVispSˆH , Tiq (591)
p589q ùñ :opxj P SˆH |Tj ^ Tj ăSˆH Ti (592)
p592q ^ SˆH |ˆTj Ď LVispSˆH , Tiq ùñ opj P LVispSˆH , Tiq (593)
Lemma 88. Given SˆH and any two transactions Ti, Tj P SˆH s.t. there is an operation
execution wjpxqv Ñ ok j P SˆH |Tj and ripxq Ñ v P SˆH |Ti then there is no operation
wkpxqu Ñ okk (executed by some Tk P SˆH) in VispSˆH , Tiq s.t. wkpxqu Ñ okk precedes
ripxq Ñ v in VispSˆH , Tiq and follows wjpxqv Ñ ok j in VispSˆH , Tiq.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that opk exists as specified.
If k “ i, then opk ăH|Ti opi, which contradicts Lemma 70 (assuming unique writes).
If k “ j, then from Lemma 84 Tj is either committed or decided on x in SˆH . If Ti
commits, then opi reading v contradicts Lemma 70. If Ti does not commit in P , then this
contradicts Lemma 85.
Otherwise, DTk P H s.t. opk P H|Tk from Lemma 84 Tj is either committed or decided
on x in SˆH and from Lemma 85 Tk is committed in H. Since Tk commits, this contradicts
Lemma 70.
Lemma 89. Given SˆH and any two transaction Ti, Tj P SˆH s.t. there is an operation execu-
tion wjpxqv Ñ ok j P SˆH |Tj and ripxq Ñ v P SˆH |Ti then there is no operation wkpxqu Ñ okk
(executed by some Tk P SˆH) in LVispSˆH , Tiq s.t. wkpxqu Ñ okk precedes ripxq Ñ v in
VispSˆH , Tiq and follows wjpxqv Ñ ok j in VispSˆH , Tiq.
Proof. By analogy to Lemma 88.
Lemma 90. Any SVA history H is final-state last-use opaque.
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Proof. Given SˆH , let Ti P SˆH be any transaction that is committed in SˆH . In that case,
from Lemma 86 and Lemma 88, every read operation execution ripxq Ñ v in VispSˆH , Tiq
is preceded in VispSˆH , Tiq by a write operation execution wjpxqv Ñ ok j (for some Tj). In
addition, from Assumption 1, every write operation execution wipxqv Ñ ok i in VispSˆH , Tiq
trivially writes v P D. Therefore, for every variable x, VispSˆH , Tiq|x P Seqpxq, so VispSˆH , Tiq
is legal. Consequently Ti in SˆH is legal in SˆH .
Given the same SˆH , let Ti P SˆH be any transaction that is not committed in SˆH (so it is
aborted in SˆH). From Lemma 87 and Lemma 89, every read operation execution ripxq Ñ v
in LVispSˆH , Tiq is preceded in LVispSˆH , Tiq by a write operation execution wjpxqv Ñ ok j (for
some Tj). In addition, from Assumption 1, every write operation execution wipxqv Ñ ok i in
LVispSˆH , Tiq trivially writes v P D. Therefore, for every variable x, LVispSˆH , Tiq|x P Seqpxq,
so LVispSˆH , Tiq is legal. Thus, Ti in SˆH is last-use legal in SˆH .
Since all committed transactions in SˆH are legal in SˆH and since all aborted transactions
in SˆH are last-use legal in SˆH , then, by Def. 21 H is final-state last use opaque.
Theorem 22. Any SVA history H is last-use opaque.
Proof. Since by Lemma 90 any SVA history H is final-state last-use opaque, and any prefix
P of H is also an SVA history, then every prefix of H is also final-state last-use opaque.
Thus, by Def. 22, H is last-use opaque.
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